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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Essays on Consumer Online Search and Digital Content Consumption 
by 
Shuo Zhang 
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020 
Professor Tat Y. Chan, Co-Chair 
Associate Professor George-Levi Gayle, Co-Chair 
In my dissertation, I apply empirical quantitative methods to marketing research and investigate 
consumer online search and purchase patterns, as well as digital consumption behaviors and the 
potential implication for marketing managers. This dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter 
1 studies the consumer shopping channel choice when they search and shop for products online. 
Mobile phones have emerged as a major channel for online shopping as an alternative to PCs. 
Despite more consumers using mobile phones, the conversion rate on the mobile channel is lower 
than that on the PC channel. In this study, we propose a structural consumer search-and-purchase 
model that endogenizes the channel choice to explain the observed data pattern. Results suggest 
starting a search session using mobile phones is less costly, but intensive search is costlier. 
Consequently, mobile phones attract consumers who tend to have lower overall purchase interests 
and will search less. Based on the results, we use counterfactuals to explore how online retailers 
can customize their marketing strategies for consumers on the two channels. We find the optimal 
price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC. When sellers retarget non-purchasers by offering 
channel-specific coupons, the optimal coupon value is 6% higher for consumers on mobile than 




Chapter 2 examines consumers’ time-inconsistent preferences in digital content consumption and 
their strategic self-control behaviors. We use a unique dataset obtained from a major digital book 
platform in China, where consumers can pay either by chapters or by monthly subscription. One-
third of consumers consistently choose to pay by chapters, even though monthly subscription 
would significantly reduce the monetary cost. We propose a dynamic structural model that 
incorporates time-inconsistent preferences and strategic self-control behaviors to rationalize 
overpaying behavior. We first analytically demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium, and 
show how, under steady states, overpaying for reading may be optimal for consumers. We then 
estimate the model from the data. Results show that there is a large segment of consumers who are 
highly price-sensitive. They are also willing to overpay to curb future consumption. Our 
counterfactuals show that eliminating the pay-per-chapter plan would hurt consumer welfare and 
the platform’s profit. Eliminating the monthly subscription plan, however, would increase the 
platform’s profit but reduce consumer welfare. We introduce a novel nonlinear pricing plan with 
volume surcharge and illustrate how it can simultaneously improve the platform’s profit and 
consumer welfare.  
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Chapter 1  
Online Shopping with Endogenous PC and 
Mobile Channel Choice 
Co-authored with Zhengling Jiang and Hai Che 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the online retail industry has seen a rapid increase in traffic from mobile devices 
compared to traditional PCs, including desktops and laptops. In the US, the average time adults 
spend using mobile devices to shop has surpassed that using PC since 2015.1  Knowing the 
popularity of online shopping by smartphones, most major US retailers have been aggressively 
increasing their investment in both mobile application development and advertisement.2 
Despite the more intensive usage of smartphones, consumers make fewer purchases from 
mobile devices than from PCs. A report from Business Insider Intelligence shows that although 
almost 60% of the time is allocated to the mobile device, only 15% of the total sales are generated 
from this channel.3 Such disproportionally low sales on mobile is consistent with the conversion-
rate gap between the two channels. Based on data collected from over 1.9 billion shopping sessions 










that on mobile (e.g., the average conversion rate is 4.14% on PC and 1.55% on mobile in 2016 
Q4).4  
The systematic differences in browsing and purchase behaviors between PC and mobile 
channels offer online retailers an opportunity to differentiate and target consumers on the two 
channels. Traditional multi-channel retailers with online and offline channels have been engaging 
in channel-based price differentiation (Wolk and Ebling 2010, Cavallo 2017). With the emerging 
mobile channel, some companies have offered lower prices for mobile users. For example, 
anecdotal evidence shows Kayak and Orbitz quote lower hotel prices for mobile users than for PC 
users.5 Other companies do the opposite. Hannak et al. (2014) document that Home Depot provides 
more expensive products for mobile users than for desktop users. Many other companies do not 
engage in differential product offerings on the two channels. Clearly, what pricing strategy is more 
profitable depends on how consumers on the two channels differ from each other. 
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to study how and, more importantly, why 
consumer search and purchase behaviors on PC and mobile channels differ. To achieve this goal, 
we develop a structural consumer search model with endogenous channel choice. The proposed 
model can explain how different types of consumers choose the shopping channel depending on 
the benefits and costs of using each channel. By modeling the consumer’s channel choice, our 
model rationalizes the intriguing data pattern of a higher usage rate but a significantly lower 
conversion rate on mobile. Estimation results from our model can help firms predict which 







second objective of the paper, which is to design channel-specific marketing strategies targeting 
consumers on the two channels. Without the structural model, whether and how prices should 
differ on the two channels is not ex-ante clear. 
We estimate the proposed model using a unique clickstream dataset from both PC and 
mobile channels from Taobao, the largest online shopping platform in China. Consumers can use 
PCs or smartphones to browse and make purchases. The data set contains information on which 
channel consumers use to browse and purchase. We observe each consumer’s search activities 
(through browsing different product options) and purchase decisions. We also collect some 
additional information, such as consumer demographics and their smartphone attributes that may 
influence consumer channel choice. 
Based on the data, we find (1) a higher proportion of consumer usage, (2) a smaller number 
of searches per customer, and (3) a lower conversion rate for the mobile channel than for the PC 
channel, consistent with the industry reports of the US market.6 Even after controlling for the 
difference in the number of searches on the two channels, the gap in the conversion rate remains 
unchanged. Estimation results show that, on average, the marginal search cost for an additional 
search is ¥1.55 (or US$0.23) higher on mobile than on PC. The average initial fixed search cost 
for starting a search session, however, is ¥1.66 (or US$0.25) higher on PC than on mobile. How 
does this difference influence consumers’ channel choice and conversion rate on each channel? 
When deciding which channel to shop, consumers consider the search-cost differences and choose 
the channel that maximizes the expected utility after search. Given the lower marginal search cost 





mobile. Because consumers with higher overall valuation are willing to search more, they are more 
likely to self-select into using the PC channel. Consumers with a lower valuation of the category 
are more likely to conduct fewer searches and choose the mobile channel due to a lower initial 
fixed cost. This mechanism of consumer self-selection in our model therefore explains the 
observed conversion-rate gap between the two channels. We present evidence in the paper that 
several other alternative explanations, including the difference in transaction costs, cannot explain 
this difference. 
The estimation results also show the heterogeneity in search costs and channel choices 
across different types of consumers. For example, consumers with more prior purchases and a 
longer registration history on the platform are associated with a lower fixed search cost on PCs, 
likely because these consumers were more accustomed to shopping from PCs before the mobile 
phones became popular. In terms of demographics, younger consumers and women are more likely 
to choose the mobile channel. Different types of smartphones influence the marginal search cost 
on mobile. We find that smartphones with a higher screen resolution (typically associated with a 
larger screen size) and better operating systems are associated with a lower marginal search cost, 
which increases the likelihood of using the mobile channel. 
To guide how sellers can better target consumers on the two channels, we conduct 
counterfactual analyses. We first investigate the optimal strategy if sellers set different prices on 
PC versus mobile channels. Optimal prices can be different because consumers drawn to shopping 
on the two channels are systematically different. Our proposed model accounts for both channel 
choice and search activity. We find the optimal price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC, because 
consumers on the PC channel tend to have higher overall valuation due to the self-selection in 
channel choice. Next, we investigate the retargeting strategy by providing a coupon for consumers 
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who browsed but did not purchase. When sellers utilize the information of consumer channel 
choice, results suggest the optimal coupon value is about 6% higher for consumers on mobile than 
on PC. Although this analysis focuses on non-purchasers, the result is consistent with a lower 
optimal price on mobile suggested by the first counterfactual. Overall, sellers’ profit increase is 
5.1% higher when the retargeting strategy is channel specific than when it does not differentiate 
channels. The counterfactual results illustrate the importance of considering consumers’ channel 
choice when planning marketing activities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related literature in section 1.2 
and present the data in section 1.3. We develop the model in section 1.4, followed by the estimation 
strategy and model identification in section 1.5. The estimation results are discussed in section 1.6. 
Section 1.7 presents the counterfactual regarding optimal channel-specific pricing and retargeting 
strategies. We conclude the paper and suggest future research in section 1.8.   
1.2 Literature Review 
Our paper is related to the multi-channel retailing literature. It has always been of interest for 
marketers to understand how to manage customers in a multi-channel environment. In the existing 
literature, researchers are primarily concerned about issues related to online shopping websites, 
physical stores, and catalogs (e.g., Neslin et al. 2006, Verhoef et al. 2007, Ansari et al. 2008, Neslin 
and Shankar 2009, Venkatesan et al. 2007, Wang and Goldfarb 2017, Forman et al. 2009). One of 
the questions of interest in this line of research is to understand the behavioral difference for 
consumers who use different channels. Hitt and Frei (2002) document the difference in consumer 
characteristics and behavior with PC and traditional banking. Degeratu et al. (2000) find that online 
and physical store environments can affect consumer choices in different ways. Our paper 
investigates the difference in behavioral patterns (e.g., the intensity of search, conversion rate, etc.) 
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for consumers who use smartphones or PCs to shop, which is a relatively new and increasingly 
important multi-channel context. Different from de Hann et al. (2018), who focus on the 
conversion rate for consumers who switch devices between mobile and PC, we explain the 
conversion-rate difference for consumers who choose either channel. By treating channel as an 
endogenous choice in our model, we can not only explain the observed behavioral difference on 
mobile and PC channels, but can also provide guidance on how sellers can offer channel-specific 
pricing and promotional strategies to increase profit. 
This paper is also related to the growing literature about consumers using mobile devices. 
Existing research has studied how consumers respond to firms’ mobile marketing activities 
(Shankar and Balasubramanian 2009, Andrews et al. 2016), the impact of the mobile channel on 
consumer purchase (Einav et al. 2014, Wang et al. 2015, Xu et al. 2016) and news consumption 
(Xu et al. 2014), content generation and usage (Ghose and Han, 2011), and consumer search 
behaviors (Daurer et al. 2016). Using data from eBay, Einav et al. (2014) document that the mobile 
channel is more often used for strictly browsing, leading to a lower conversion rate than on PC. 
They also find the mobile channel is more often used for common products instead of idiosyncratic 
items that require more careful inspection. Ghose et al. (2012) find the search cost is higher on 
mobile than on PC, although local activities (distance) matter more. They do not explicitly model 
how consumers choose between the two channels. Different from the existing literature on the 
mobile channel, our paper studies the consumer channel choice using a structural model. 
Furthermore, our paper documents how channel choice differs across consumers with different 
demographics, purchase history, and mobile-device attributes. 
Finally, the paper is related to the literature of consumer search. Because information 
gathering is costly (i.e., requiring time and effort), consumers cannot review all possible options 
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when making a purchase. Recent empirical studies have estimated consumer search models to 
describe how consumers make search and purchase decisions (e.g., Kim et al. 2010, Koulayev 
2014, Honka 2014, Chen and Yao 2016, Kim et al. 2016, Honka and Chintagunta 2016). 
Understanding consumer search is important for firms when making marketing decisions, such as 
pricing (e.g., Hong and Shum 2006, Wildenbeest 2011, Zhang et al. 2018). Most of the existing 
literature considers consumer search behavior on one channel, which is likely driven by the 
availability of browsing data only from one channel (e.g., Chen and Yao [2016] and Ursu [2018] 
study consumer search behaviors using online browsing data). Honka (2014) considers different 
channels by allowing the search cost to differ when obtaining an insurance quote through the 
insurer website, online quote service, or call center. In this paper, we obtain consumers’ browsing 
and purchase data as well as which channel, PC or mobile, consumers use. Our search model 
endogenizes consumers’ channel choice, which allows us to study the optimal channel-specific 
pricing and promotional strategies. A recent working paper by Jiang et al. (2019) uses a consumer 
search model to explore the effectiveness of retargeting strategies. We also study how to improve 
the effectiveness of retargeting strategies in one of the counterfactuals; however, our focus is on 
channel-specific strategies. 
1.3 Data 
Our dataset comes from Taobao, which is the largest online shopping platform in China and is 
owned by Alibaba. Taobao has both mobile and PC channels for consumers to browse and make 
purchases. The product offerings and their attributes, including prices, are the same on the two 
channels. From the dataset, we observe detailed individual-level browsing history and purchase 
decisions and, more importantly, through which channel, mobile or PC, a browsing activity 
happens. The dataset also contains additional consumer characteristics including demographic 
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information, smartphone attributes (even for those who did not use the mobile channel to make 
purchases in our data), and prior shopping history on the platform. We collect data for consumers 
who had browsed the fishing pole category. We observe search and purchases of 133,896 unique 
consumers during the data-observation period from October 15, 2014, to November 15, 2014. 
Among those consumers, 51% had browsed at least one product option from the mobile channel 
and 49% from the PC channel. Moreover, only 6% of them had used both PC and mobile channels 
during the one-month data-observation period. Most purchasers (99.2%) bought only one product 
during the sample period. Thus, we assume consumers have a unit demand in the model. 
The data show the browsing and purchase patterns are very different on mobile versus PC. 
First, the conversion rate, defined as the percentage of consumers who made a purchase out of 
those who browsed, is significantly lower on mobile (9.93%) than on PC (13.59%). Second, the 
search intensity, defined as the number of unique products browsed, is higher on PC than on 
mobile: 58% of consumers browse one product on PC, compared to 65% on mobile, and 28% of 
consumers browse at least three products on PC, compared to 20% on mobile. Figure 1.1 
graphically compares the proportion of consumers shopping on the two channels conditional on 
the number of searches. More consumers choose the mobile channel if they only search one option; 





Figure 1.1 Proportion of Consumers on Each Channel by Number of Products Searched 
 
Table 1.1 reports the average and the standard deviation of prices and number of searched 
options. We observe consumer demographics, gender and age, for 65% of the sample. We also 
collect consumers’ smartphone-device information including the model, screen size, and the 
phone’s operating system, for 82% of the sample. The rest of Table 1.1 reports the variable 
descriptions and summary statistics for consumer demographics and mobile-device characteristics. 
Table 1.1 Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Price Unit price for fishing poles 263.7 63.69 
Search times Number of products browsed by consumers 1.89 1.27 
Buyer rating Based on buyer’s prior purchase history 3.8 1.96 
Buyer rating missing Indicator variable; equals 1 if buyer rating is 
missing 0.005 –    
Buyer spending Buyer total spending in ¥ before data 


















Buyer history Number of days passed since the buyer 
registered on the website 1099 831.47 
Screen resolution 
(length) Smartphone screen resolution in pixels (width) 1184 392.86 
Screen resolution 
(width) 
Smartphone screen resolution in pixels (height) 782.3 299.42 
IOS Indicator variable; equals 1 for IOS operating 
system 0.34 – 
Android Indicator variable; equals 1 for Android 
operating system 0.15 – 
Mobile browsing Total number of products browsed on a 
smartphone before data observation period 173.9 295.90 
Male Indicator variable; equals 1 for male 0.56 – 
Age Buyer’s age 30. 6 8.47 
Male missing   Indictor variable; equals 1 if gender 
information is missing 0.09 – 
Age missing Indictor variable; equals 1 if age information is 
missing 0.13 – 
Mobile missing Indicator variable; equals 1 if there is no 
smartphone information 0.34 – 
1.3.1 Channel Choice 
The prices for fishing poles did not change over time during our sample observation period. Other 
product attributes are also identical on mobile and PC, and thus do not affect the channel choice. 
Consumer characteristics, on the other hand, may affect the choice. We use a reduced-form 
regression to test how consumers who choose to use PC or mobile are systematically different. 
Using channel choice as the dependent variable, which equals 1 if the consumer chooses PC, and 
0 if he chooses mobile, we run a probit regression to study how the channel choice correlates with 
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various observed consumer characteristics (described in Table 1.1).7 Results are reported in Table 
2. 
Table 1.2 Channel Choice with Consumer Characteristics 
 Estimate Std. Error p-value 
(Intercept) -1.12 0.08 *** 
Buyer rating 0.12 4.06E-03 *** 
Buyer rating missing -0.32 0.03 *** 
Buyer spending 8.38E-05 2.11E-05 *** 
Buyer history 7.89E-05 6.66E-06 *** 
Screen resolution -1.12E-07 6.52E-09 *** 
IOS -0.03 0.01 ** 
Android -0.05 0.01 *** 
Mobile browsing -2.03E-03 2.84E-05 *** 
Mobile missing 1.82E-03 1.22E-02  
Male 0.40 0.08 *** 
Age 0.01 5.97E-04 *** 
Gender missing -0.04 0.08  
Age missing 0.23 0.08 ** 
Note:                            *:p<0.1; **:p<0.05; ***:p<0.01 
 
Considerable heterogeneity exists among consumers who choose PC or mobile. We find 
that younger consumers and consumers who use mobile phones with higher screen resolution and 
 
7 We multiply the screen resolution in pixels in length and width, and use the demeaned value to represent screen 
resolution in the model estimation. 
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more advanced operating systems 8  are more likely to use the mobile channel. In addition, 
consumers with a higher buyer rating (based on a higher number of prior purchases) and higher 
prior spending are more likely to use the PC channel, both of which positively correlate with the 
consumer’s past experience on Taobao. These consumers are likely more familiar with the PC 
channel than the mobile channel because Taobao only introduced the mobile channel in 2008.9 
The reduced-form evidence suggests the observed consumer characteristics significantly correlate 
with their channel choice. We incorporate these characteristics in the structural model to account 
for consumer heterogeneity. 
1.3.2 Potential Explanations for the Conversion-Rate Difference 
The underlying mechanism driving the observed data pattern in our model is that consumers 
endogenously choose which channel to browse. We identify and estimate both a marginal search 
cost (for an addition search) as well as an initial fixed cost (for starting a search session) for the 
two channels. The channel choice depends on the level of overall valuation as well as the cost to 
search on the two channels. Before describing the full model, we discuss in this subsection several 
possible explanations for the lower conversion rate on mobile compared to PC to help justify our 
model setup. Note we assume consumers have a choice between using mobile or PC. The CNNIC 
(the Chinese administrative agency responsible for Internet affairs) reports that among Internet 
users, the smartphone penetration is 85.8%, and desktop and laptop penetrations are 70.8% and 
43.2% during 2014.10 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that consumers have access to both 
types of devices. 
 
8  Apple and Android operating systems were considered advanced in China during 2014, when many other 
smartphones used operating systems developed by local manufacturers.  
9 Source: https://yq.aliyun.com/articles/583335. 
10 Source: http://www.cac.gov.cn/files/pdf/hlwtjbg/hlwlfzzktjbg035.pdf. 
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The first potential explanation is that the lower conversion rate on mobile is driven by a 
higher marginal search cost. With a higher marginal search cost, consumers browse fewer options 
and are less likely to find a good match and make a purchase on mobile. To test the hypothesis that 
the difference in the marginal search costs is the only cause for the conversion-rate gap, we 
compare the conversion rates for consumers who browsed the same number of products. Figure 
1.2 shows the conversion rate on PC is still consistently higher than that on mobile among 
consumers who browse the same number of products. Therefore, although the marginal search-
cost difference between the two channels can lead to an overall conversion-rate gap, it cannot 
explain the gap after controlling for the number of products browsed.  
 
Figure 1.2 Conversion Rate with Number of Products Searched 
The second potential explanation is the difference in transaction cost for completing a 
purchase on mobile versus PC. For example, consumers may have difficulty typing in the shipping 
address or the payment information when using a smartphone without a keyboard. In that case, 
consumers might be more likely to abandon the shopping session on mobile without purchase. To 
test this explanation, we focus on a small group of consumers (6%) who use both channels to 






























conversion rate on PC among these consumers as well. Figure 2.3 shows that among the consumers 
who browse both channels, the conversion rates on the two channels are almost the same (12.9% 
on PC, 12.2% on mobile). The interpretation for the equal conversion rates is that either the 
transaction cost is the same on both channels or the transaction cost is trivial, so it does not play 
an important role in determining where to purchase. In reality, once a debit or credit card is linked 
to the account, consumers on Taobao only need to type in a six-digit password for payment using 
mobile devices. Therefore, the time and effort required for payment on mobile is not distinctively 
higher than that on PC.  
 
Figure 1.3 Conversion Rate on Mobile and PC for Consumers Who Used Both Channels 
1.4 Model 
We propose a consumer search-and-purchase model that incorporates endogenous channel choice. 
Before starting the search, consumers first choose through which channel (mobile or PC) to browse 
the products. We assume consumers can only choose one channel, due to the empirical observation 
that only 6% of consumers ever switch devices in our data. We exclude this small group of 
consumers in our empirical analysis to keep the model tractable.  
Conditional on the channel choice, consumers then decide how many product options to 


















study consumer search behavior. We do not observe the order of search from data. This data 
limitation makes estimating a sequential search very difficult. Prior empirical studies (e.g., De Los 
Santos et al. 2012 and Honka 2013) have tested the two search models and found evidence to 
support the simultaneous-search model. Therefore, we follow these studies by assuming 
consumers conduct simultaneous search. We note that if the data on the search order are available, 
our proposed framework of channel choice can be easily carried through to scenarios where 
consumers search sequentially. 
Finally, given the channel choice and the number of product options to search, consumers 
will search on the retail platform. After the search, they will decide whether to purchase from the 
searched options and, if they do, which option they should buy.  
1.4.1 Consumer Utility and Search  
We first describe consumers’ search and purchase decisions after they have selected a channel to 
browse. Suppose there are 𝐼 consumers and 𝐽 products. The utility of product 𝑗 for consumer 𝑖 is 
specified as 
𝑢!" = 𝑎! − 𝜆 ∙ 𝑃" + 𝑒!",      (1) 
where 𝑎!  is consumer 𝑖$𝑠 valuation for the product category. We allow 𝑎!  to be heterogeneous 
across consumers with a normal distribution 𝑎!~𝑁(𝜇% , 𝜎%&). 𝑃" is the price of product 𝑗 and 𝑒!" is 
the individual match value. We assume 𝑒!" follows i.i.d. extreme-value type-I distribution across 
consumers and products. If the consumer decides not to purchase any product after search, he 
chooses the outside option denoted by 𝑒!' . The outside option 𝑒!'  represents consumer 𝑖$𝑠 
valuation of purchasing from other websites or purchasing other products. We assume consumers 
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know their own outside option before conducting the search activities. 𝑒!' is assumed to follow 
i.i.d. extreme-value type-I distribution across consumers.   
Denote channel choice as 𝑠! ∈ {1,0}, where 𝑠! = 1 if consumer 𝑖 chooses the PC channel, 
and 𝑠! = 0 if choosing mobile. We first describe how consumers decide the number of product 
options to search, conditional on choosing channel s. Before the search, consumer 𝑖 knows his 
initial utility level 𝑎!. We assume the consumer knows the overall distribution of 𝑝" 	and 𝑒!", but 
he has no information on 𝑝" 	and 𝑒!" for a specific retailer 𝑗, which are only revealed if he clicks 
into the product detail page. Therefore, the expected 𝑢!" conditional on purchase for all product 
options are the same to the consumer before the search, but the overall expected utility from search 
will be different due to individuals having different levels of 𝑎!  and thus different purchase 
probabilities. The justification of this assumption is that many small sellers are on Taobao, and 
none of them belong to well-known branded manufacturers. Consumers are unlikely to have a 
priori information on the quality of any specific seller. Furthermore, each seller sells multiple 
brands and models of fishing poles; without searching for detailed information on the product 
page, consumers are unlikely to know anything about the price or other product and service 
attributes.  
Under this assumption, our simultaneous search model focuses on how many product 
options the consumer chooses to search, denoted by 𝑏!. Consumer 𝑖 incurs a marginal search cost 
𝑐!( for each product he browses. We allow the marginal search cost to vary across the two channels 
and individuals. Furthermore, as is common in the search literature, our data do not include 
consumers who do not search at all. Thus, we require that consumers search at least once in the 
model. A consumer chooses 𝑏! to maximize the expected utility taking account of the search cost. 
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Following Chade and Smith (2010), the consumer maximizes the following indirect utility by 
choosing the number of searches: 
𝐼𝑈!(𝑏) = 𝐸 Amax"∈*!"
E𝑢!"FG − 𝑏! ∙ 𝑐!(,    (2) 
where 𝐶!+ is the set of the searched options (the outside option 𝑒!' is always an element in 𝐶!+).  
The probability that consumer 𝑖 chooses to search 𝑏! times is 
𝑃!+|-,( = 𝑃{𝐼𝑈!(𝑏) ≥ 𝐼𝑈!(𝑏$)|𝑎! , 𝑠!}.    (3) 
 After the search, consumers make their purchase decisions by comparing the realized 
utilities among the choice set (knowing the price and individual match value) and the outside 
option. Consumer 𝑖′𝑠 conditional purchase probability for product 𝑘 is 
 𝑃!.|/,+,-,( = 𝑃E𝑢!. > 𝑢!.# , ∀𝑘$ ∈ 𝐶!+P𝑒!" , 𝑃" , 𝑎! , 𝑠!F.   (4) 
In other words, the consumer will choose option 𝑘 if the realized utility is larger than any other 
options 𝑘$ in the choice set.  
Note that various factors, including the ranking of product options (e.g., Ursu 2018), may 
affect the final outcome. We do not observe those factors from data. The impact of these factors 
on the purchase decision is captured by 𝑒!", which is unknown to the consumer when he decides 
the optimal 𝑏!. Conditional on 𝑏!, these factors may affect which product options the consumer 
will search, as well as the order of the search. Our model is agnostic about what options are 
searched and how they are searched. Importantly, these unobserved factors do not affect our main 
focus on consumer channel choice. 
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1.4.2 Consumer Channel Choice 
Before starting the search process, consumers choose whether to use a smartphone or a PC to shop. 
We introduce a fixed search cost in addition to the marginal search cost for both channels. Different 
from the marginal search cost, which depends on how many products a consumer browses, the 
fixed search cost is a one-time upfront cost to start a search session. The fixed cost can come from 
the time and effort required to use a PC or a smartphone to initialize the search process, whereas 
the marginal search cost is associated with the time and effort required to gather information from 
the product page. Prior literature (Ghose et al. 2012) and the data pattern of a higher number of 
searches on PCs suggests the marginal search cost on mobile should be higher than that on PCs, 
likely because of the smaller screen and lack of keyboard on a smartphone. On the other hand, we 
expect the PC channel to have a higher fixed cost than the mobile channel, because the portability 
of a smartphone allows consumers to access it from anywhere.11  
We allow individual heterogeneity in both the fixed and marginal search costs given the 
consumer’s demographic information, mobile-device features, and past usage patterns. For 
example, younger consumers may be more proficient in using their smartphones for online 
shopping. In addition, smartphones with larger screen sizes or advanced operating systems could 
make the search process more effortless and thus are associated with a lower marginal search cost. 
Because consumers choose one of the channels to search, for model identification, the fixed cost 
of the mobile channel is normalized to 0. We specify the fixed cost of the PC channel as 
𝑓𝑐! = 𝜇01 + 𝛽𝑍! + 𝑣!01 ,     (5) 
 
11 We assume consumers have access to both channels. If a consumer cannot access a channel (e.g., cannot use PC to 
shop while in transit), the model interprets such cases as the consumers having a very high fixed search cost to start a 
shopping session on PC. 
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where 𝜇01 is a constant term, 𝑍! is a list of relevant consumer characteristics and device attributes, 
and 𝜈!01  captures the unobservable heterogeneity and is assumed to follow a standard normal 
distribution. We do not impose the fixed cost on PC to be higher or lower than that on mobile. The 
estimated parameters determine the sign and magnitude of the fixed cost on PC for different 
consumers.  
Consumers pay a marginal search cost for an additional search. The marginal search cost 
for consumer 𝑖 on the PC channel (𝑠! = 1) is   
𝑐!2 = exp(𝜇1 + 𝜎1𝑣!1),     (6) 
where 𝑣!1 follows a standard normal distribution. The marginal search cost is guaranteed to be 
positive in this specification (e.g., Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004).  
The marginal search for consumer 𝑖 on the mobile channel (𝑠! = 0) can be systematically 
different from his marginal search cost on PC. We specify the marginal search cost as   
𝑐!' = 𝑐!2 + 𝑠𝑐' + 𝛾𝑋! ,     (7) 
where 𝑠𝑐' represents the average difference in marginal search cost between mobile and PC, 𝑋! is 
a list of consumer 𝑖$𝑠 smartphone characteristics and his past mobile shopping experience that may 
affect his marginal search cost on mobile, and 𝛾 captures the heterogeneity in marginal search cost 
with observed characteristics 𝑋!. We do not impose the difference in marginal search cost between 
mobile and PC, 𝑠𝑐' + 𝛾𝑋!, to be negative or positive. The estimated parameters determine the 
marginal search cost for different consumers. 
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We assume that before the search, consumer 𝑖 is aware of the distribution for prices and 
individual match values. He knows his level of interest in the product category 𝑎! and his outside 
option 𝑒!'. He also knows his marginal and fixed search costs for both channels. Based on the 
information, the consumer forms expectations on the utility for each channel. Let 𝐹!+(  be the 
cumulative distribution function of the expected maximum utility among 𝑏 products searched by 
consumer 𝑖  on channel 𝑠 , and 𝑓!+(  is the corresponding pdf function. The calculation of 𝐹!+(  is 
shown in detail in the next section. The consumer’s expected utility for channel  is  
𝐸𝐶𝑈!( = max+ [𝐹!+
( (𝑒!') ∙ 𝑒!' + ∫ 𝑓!+( (𝑢)𝑢𝑑𝑢 − 𝑓𝑐! ∙ 𝑠! − 𝑏! ∙ 𝑐!(
34
/!$
].  (8) 
When the maximum utility from the 𝑏 browsed products is lower than the outside option, the 
consumer chooses the outside option. Otherwise, he will choose the maximum of the searched 
options. The consumer chooses the channel that offers a higher expected utility. The channel 
choice probability thus is  
𝑃!(|-	 = 𝑃_𝐸𝐶𝑈!( ≥ 𝐸𝐶𝑈!(
#P𝑎!`, 𝑠$ ∈ {0,1}.                (9) 
To summarize, the channel choice depends on their overall valuation, outside option value, 
and the fixed and marginal search costs on the two channels. The proposed model is able to capture 
the difference in channel choices among consumers with different observed characteristics by 
incorporating heterogeneous fixed and marginal search costs. Moreover, it provides a mechanism 
of how consumers with different product valuation and search costs tend to select certain channel. 
This endogenous channel choice is key to understanding the observed conversion rate and search 




1.5 Model Estimation and Identification 
In this section, we lay out detailed model-estimation procedures, present results from a Monte 
Carlo simulation study, and discuss the model identification.  
1.5.1 Estimation Procedure 
The likelihood function comprises the three parts of consumer decisions: choosing a 
channel (channel choice probability 𝑃!,(|- ), searching 𝑏  product options (optimal search-time 
probability, 𝑃!,+|-,( ), and purchase decisions (purchase probability 𝑃!.|/,+,-,( ). The likelihood 
function integrates over the distribution of the outside option 𝑒!', the individual shock for fixed 
search cost 𝜈!01 and marginal search cost 𝑣!1, and the valuation of the product category 𝑎!:  






(6' k8!62 .  
(10) 
The probability functions in the equation do not have a closed-form solution. We use 
simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the model by drawing from the corresponding 
distributions for numerical integration. More specifically, we draw the following variables 𝑄 
times. Consumer 𝑖$𝑠  match value for product 𝑗  𝑒!"
9  and the outside option 𝑒!'
9  are drawn 
independently from extreme-value type-I distribution. The error terms for fixed search cost and 
marginal search cost, 𝜈!1
9  and 𝜈!01
9 , are drawn i.i.d. from a standard normal distribution. 
Consumers’ utility constant term is parameterized as	𝑎! = 𝜇% + 𝜎% ∙ 𝑒!-
9 , where 𝑒!-
9  is drawn from 
a standard normal distribution. 
We assume consumers know the distribution of prices prior to search, but the actual values 
are only realized after they browse the product detail pages and pay the corresponding search cost. 
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Before the main model estimation, we first estimate the price distribution, which determines the 
benefit from an additional price search. Following prior literature on price-search models (e.g., 
Hong and Shum 2006, Moraga-González and Wildenbeest 2008, Honka 2014), we assume prices 
follow an extreme-value type-I distribution and estimate the price-distribution parameters. We use 
the estimated price-distribution parameters in the model estimation. 
Consumers form expectations of the benefit they receive under a specific number of 
searches. We evaluate the distribution of the benefit consumers receive from drawing the price and 
individual match value 𝑏 times. To calculate the distribution of the expected benefit from search 
given one set of parameters, we draw from the price and individual match-value distributions b 
times, and calculate the expected maximum value as 𝑉+ = max{−𝜆𝑝2 + 𝑒2, … , −𝜆𝑝+ + 𝑒+}. The 
process is repeated Q times. We get a 𝑄-length vector of 𝑉+  for 𝑏  number of searches, which 
represents the distribution of the expected benefit from searching 𝑏 times.   
To calculate channel choice probability (equation 8), we evaluate the expected utility from 
choosing channel 𝑠 (equation 7). For consumer 𝑖, the expected utility from searching 𝑏! times on 
channel 𝑠! is 
𝐸𝐶𝑈q!( = max+
[𝑢!+( ] − 𝑓𝑐! ∙ 𝑠! ,                                                 (11) 
where 𝑢!+(  is the maximum utility from the searched products and the outside option minus the 
corresponding marginal search cost. To calculate 𝑢!+(  through simulation, we draw 𝑄 times from 
the distributions for overall product valuation, outside option, and marginal search cost. We 
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We draw the fixed-search-cost random-error term 𝑄 times to calculate 𝑓𝑐! as specified in equation 
5. The expected utility for channel 𝑠 𝐸𝐶𝑈q!( is the maximum of 𝑢!+(  by selecting the optimal number 
of searches 𝑏! minus the corresponding fixed search cost. 
Consumers choose the channel that gives them higher expected utility 𝐸𝐶𝑈q!
(, 𝑠 ∈ (0,1). 
The channel-choice probability calculated from the simulations is not a smooth function. 
Following prior literature (McFadden 1989, Honka 2014), we apply a kernel-smoothing method 
where the choice probability is represented by a scaled multivariate logistic CDF. The probability 
of consumer i choosing channel 𝑠! is  
𝑃!( =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 f−𝜔2 ∙ _𝐸𝐶𝑈q!( − 𝐸𝐶𝑈q!2:(`k
, 
where ω2 is a scaling parameter.  
Next, we evaluate the probability of searching 𝑏! times. Consumers choose the number of 
searches by maximizing the expected utility (equation 3). Applying the kernel-smoothing method, 
the probability of consumer i choosing to search 𝑏! times conditional on choosing channel 𝑠! is 
𝑃!+|(	 =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝	(−𝜔& ∙ _𝐼𝑈!,+ −max_𝐼𝑈!,:+``
, 
where ω& is a scaling parameter, and -b denotes search times other than 𝑏.  
Finally, we evaluate the purchase probability for consumers after they have chosen a 
channel and have selected the number of products to browse. The prices and individual match 
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values are realized for options in the consumers’ consideration set 𝐶!+ (the 𝑏! products consumer 
𝑖 browses). The probability that consumer 𝑖 chooses option 𝑘 from the consideration set 𝐶!+  on 
channel 𝑠! is  
𝑃!.|*!"( =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝	(−𝜔; ∙ (𝑢!. −max(𝑢!.#))
, 
where 𝑘$ denotes choices other than option 𝑘, including the outside option 𝑘 = 0 when consumers 
do not make a purchase, and ω; is a scaling parameter. 
Combining the three sets of probabilities together, we obtain the overall probability of 
observing consumer i choosing channel 𝑠!, searching 𝑏! times, and choosing option 𝑘. We evaluate 
this probability through simulation by drawing the error terms for overall product valuation 𝛼!, 
fixed and marginal search costs 𝜈!01 , 𝜈!1, individual match value for each product searched 𝑒!", and 
outside option 𝑒!'  𝑄  times. The overall likelihood considers channel-choice probability 𝑃!(
9 , 
number-of-searches probability 𝑃!+|(	
9 , and purchase probability 𝑃!.|*!"(








9 .    (12) 
1.5.2 Identification 
We discuss the identification of the model parameters. The parameters can be divided into three 
categories: the marginal search-cost parameters {𝜇1 , 𝜎1 , 𝑠𝑐', 𝛾}, the fixed search-cost parameters 
{𝜇01 , 𝛽}, and the utility parameters {𝜇% , 𝜎% , 𝜆}. 
For the marginal search-cost parameters, we identify the constant term and the standard 
deviation of the error terms from the distribution of search times on both PC and mobile channels. 
𝑠𝑐' captures the average difference in marginal search cost on PC and mobile. It is identified from 
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the difference in the mean of the number of searches for consumers on the PC and mobile channels. 
The systematic difference in the number of searches for consumers with different mobile attributes 
identifies the observed heterogeneity in marginal search cost across consumers on the mobile 
channel. 
The identification of the fixed search cost on the PC channel comes from consumers’ 
channel choice for browsing. Recall that the fixed search cost on the mobile channel is normalized 
to 0. The constant in the fixed cost 𝜇01 is identified from the proportion of the consumers who 
choose the PC channel, after accounting for the difference in marginal search cost. If the fixed cost 
on the PC channel is higher, more consumers will choose the mobile channel. The systematic 
difference in channel choice among consumers with different demographics, user behaviors, and 
device features identifies the observed heterogeneity in fixed cost across consumers.  
The mean of the product-category valuation 𝜇% is identified from the overall level of the 
conversion rate after search, and price sensitivity 𝜆  is identified from the purchase data. The 
variation of the overall product valuation among consumers, 𝜎%, leads to the systematic difference 
in consumers who select a certain channel for browsing. Consumers with a higher level of overall 
product valuation may systematically choose a channel given its search-cost structure. For 
example, when the average fixed cost on PC is higher than on mobile and the marginal search cost 
is lower, consumers with a high value of 𝑎! will be more likely to choose PC. In general, if 𝜎% is 
greater, the average utility difference of consumers who use PC will be greater than for those who 
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use mobile, which will lead to a larger difference in conversion rates across the two channels. 
Thus, the value of 𝜎% is identified by the systematic conversion-rate gap observed in our data. 12 
We run a Monte Carlo study to test the model identification. We simulate data for 10,000 
consumers and set the maximum number of searches at 5. The simulation procedure is as follows. 
We draw the error terms of marginal search cost 𝜈!1 and fixed search cost 𝜈!01 i.i.d. from a standard 
normal distribution. The outside option 𝑒!' is drawn from extreme-value type-I distribution. The 
expected channel utility and the optimal search times are calculated as in equations 7 and 8. With 
the chosen channel 𝑠 and search times 𝑏, consumers sample 𝑏 products. After search, consumers 
see 𝑏 prices (drawn i.i.d. from the price distribution) and the match values for each product 𝑒!" 
(drawn i.i.d. from extreme-value type-I distribution). Consumer 𝑖  makes purchase decisions 
depending on the realized utility.  
In the estimation, we set all scaling factors (𝜔2, 𝜔&, 𝜔;) in the kernel-smoothing logit 
functions to be 20. The number of simulations Q is 50. Results from the Monte Carlo study are 
reported in Table 1.3. Column (1) shows the true value of the parameters, and columns (2) and (3) 
show the estimated value and standard error. Thus, the proposed estimation procedure can 





12 When 𝜎& = 0, the systematic conversion-rate gap between PC and mobile will no longer exist.  
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𝜇-: Mean of valuation -45.0 -43.47 0.770 
𝜎-: Std. dev. of valuation 110.0 125.71 13.48 
𝜆: Price coefficient -1.5 -1.45 0.005 
Search-cost 
parameters 
𝜇1: Mean of marginal search 
cost 
4.0 4.09 0.006 
𝜎1: Std. dev. of marginal 
search cost 
0.4 0.42 0.01 
𝑠𝑐': Difference in marginal 
search cost on PC from 
mobile 
10.0 9.34 0.372 
𝜇01: Fixed search cost on PC 
(normalized to 0 on mobile) 
0.3 0.27 0.007 
1.6 Results 
We apply and estimate the proposed model using the Taobao data. In this section, we report 
and discuss the model-estimation results. In particular, we highlight how the model of channel 
choice can explain the lower conversion rate on mobile compared to PC. We show the estimated 
model can reproduce the conversion rates and the number of searches very well across both 
channels.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 1.4. The estimated parameters are presented in four 
panels. Starting from the first panel, the price coefficient is negative at -5.16 for ¥1 (or -$0.77 for 
US$1). We transform the utility parameters into dollar value by dividing the estimated parameters 
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by the price coefficient. The mean valuation for the product category 𝜇% is ¥148 (or US$21.7) and 
the standard deviation across consumers 𝜎% is ¥53 (or US$7.9).  
Table 1.4 Estimation Results 
 
 







𝜇-: Mean of valuation 763 10.55 *** 
𝜎-: Std. dev. of valuation 272 5.20 *** 




𝜇1: Mean of marginal search cost 5.09 1.35E-03 *** 
𝜎1: Std. dev. of marginal search 
cost 
0.82 3.91E-04 *** 
𝑠𝑐': Difference in marginal 
search cost on PC from mobile 
8.02 0.04 *** 
𝜇01: Fixed search cost on PC 
(normalized to 0 on mobile) 
8.57 0.05 *** 
Fixed-cost 
heterogeneity 
Buyer rating -0.03 2.43E-03 *** 
Buyer rating missing 0.01 0.02 
 
Buyer spending -1.10E-04 1.94E-05 *** 
Buyer history -9.47E-05 5.95E-05 * 
Male -0.06 0.01 *** 
Gender missing -7.85E-06 0.02 
 
Age -0.02 6.46E-04 *** 





Screen resolution -1.32E-02 4.87E-04 *** 
IOS -1.95E-04 1.08E-04 * 
Android -3.49E-05 1.44E-05 ** 
 
13 *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
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Mobile browsing -3.61E-02 3.14E-03 *** 
Mobile missing -9.57E-08 0.01 
 
 
The second panel shows the search-cost parameter estimates. Note the marginal search cost 
is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution. We calculate the mean marginal search cost for 
using PCs as exp(5.09+0.822/2)=227.3. Divided by the price coefficient, the mean cost is ¥44.05 
(or US$6.61). Using the same procedure, the mean marginal search cost for using mobiles is 
¥45.60 (or US$6.84). Thus, the average marginal search cost is 3.5% (¥1.55 or US$0.23) higher 
on mobile than on PC. The difference is statistically significant but not very large in magnitude. 
The marginal search cost determines the number of searches. This result is consistent with the data 
pattern showing the average number of searches on mobile is lower than on PC.  
The fixed search cost on mobile is normalized to 0. Dividing the fixed search-cost parameter 
by the price coefficient, the cost for using PCs is higher by ¥1.66 (or US$0.25). Compared to the 
average difference in marginal search cost ¥1.55 ($0.23), the one-time fixed cost is higher (by 
about 6.8%) than the difference in marginal search cost between the two channels. Therefore, an 
average consumer who searches only one time would prefer using the mobile channel to PC 
because of the lower fixed search cost. When the optimal search times increases, PC becomes 
increasingly appealing to consumers because of its lower marginal search cost. The results are 
consistent with the data pattern showing that a larger proportion of consumers who search less tend 
to shop on mobile phones, whereas those who search more are more likely to choose PCs. 
In addition to explaining the difference in the number of searches for consumers on the two 
channels, the marginal and fixed search-cost difference contributes to the observed gap in 
conversion rates between the two channels. When deciding which channel to search, consumers 
consider the search-cost differences and choose the channel that maximizes the expected utility 
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after search. For consumers with higher overall valuation for the product category, the probability 
of making a purchase after search is high. Consumers who are likely to buy have a higher expected 
number of searches, because one additional search can have a higher marginal benefit in terms of 
a lower price and/or a higher individual match value. With a higher expected number of searches, 
these consumers are more likely to choose the PC channel with a lower marginal search cost. 
Therefore, PC is more likely to attract consumers with a higher overall valuation, who are expected 
to have a higher number of searches. Such self-selection of consumers leads to a higher conversion 
rate on the PC channel.  
The third panel reports the observed heterogeneity of fixed search cost across consumers. 
Because Taobao started with the website optimized for PC and only introduced the mobile 
interface later, long-time consumers may have started shopping on Taobao before the introduction 
of the mobile-shopping option, and therefore become used to the PC shopping channel. We include 
measures that positively correlate with long-time usage history on the platform. Results support 
our hypothesis. Consumers with a higher buyer rating, more purchases in the past, and a longer 
buyer history on the platform are associated with a lower fixed search cost on the PC channel, 
which leads to a higher likelihood of using the PC channel compared to other consumers. This 
finding is also consistent with the probit regression results (Table 2).  
In addition to length of usage history, consumer demographics may also play a role in 
explaining the choice of PC or mobile. We find age is negatively correlated with the fixed search 
cost for the PC channel. In other words, older consumers are more likely to have a lower fixed 
search cost on PC and are therefore more likely to use the PC channel for shopping. Male 
consumers have a lower fixed search cost for PC, which means they are more likely than women 
to use the PC channel for shopping. These estimates are again consistent with the reduced form in 
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Table 2.  
In the fourth panel, we explore how the marginal search cost varies with different types of 
mobile devices. Because the marginal search cost is influenced by the effort in gathering 
information from an additional search, such a process should be less costly if gathering information 
on some mobile devices is easier. For example, consumers may find shopping using smartphones 
with a higher screen resolution (typically associated with a larger screen size) and a more robust 
operating system is easier. We find the parameter estimates for screen resolution, IOS, and Android 
operating systems are all negative and statistically significant. For smartphones with higher screen 
resolution and better operating systems, the marginal search cost becomes lower on the mobile 
channel. The results are consistent with reduced-form analysis showing that consumers with the 
more advanced smartphones are more likely to choose the mobile channel. Our results suggest that 
as the smartphone technology continues to improve, the marginal search cost on the mobile 
channel will decrease, leading to a higher number of consumers using the mobile channel for 
shopping. 
Lastly, we examine the model fit by simulating consumer actions (channel choice, number of 
searches, and purchase decision) with the model estimates, and compare simulation results with 
the actual data. We run the simulation 100 times and take the average. We compare the conversion 
rate by search times on mobile (Figure 1.4A) and PC (Figure 1.4B), and the proportion of 
consumers who search one to five times on mobile (Figure 1.4C) and PC (Figure 1.4D). Both the 
conversion rates and the search times match well between simulated and actual data on both 
channels. The proposed model can predict the key empirical patterns. First, the conversion rate is 
higher with a higher number of searches on both channels. Second, the conversion rate is higher 
on PC than on mobile for the same number of searches. Third, consumers with more intensive 
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searches (who search at least three times) are more likely to choose the PC channel, which matches 
well between the simulated and actual data. 
Figure 1.4 Model Fit by Comparing Actual and Model Simulated Data 
 
To summarize, our results suggest the self-selection of consumers can explain the gap in 
conversion rates between the two channels. The PC channel has a higher fixed search cost and a 
lower marginal search cost, and it attracts consumers with higher valuation toward the product 
category who are more likely to make a purchase. The mobile channel has the advantage of a lower 
fixed search cost, because of the channel’s great portability and ease of access anywhere. It attracts 
consumers who may not find searching on PC to be worthwhile. Therefore, the pool of consumers 












































































Consumers who choose PC and mobile channels are systematically different. Taking the different 
pools of consumers into account, we study how sellers can improve profits by utilizing channel-
specific pricing and promotion strategies. Whether sellers are better off charging a lower price or 
offering a larger promotion deal on mobile is not obvious. On the one hand, consumers have a 
smaller consideration set (lower search intensity) on mobile, which reduces price competition and 
allows sellers to set a higher price. On the other hand, the conversion rate is lower on mobile, 
which suggests consumers are less inclined to make a purchase and sellers could be better off 
lowering prices. The proposed structural model accounts for both effects. With the estimated 
model, we can provide a more complete picture for sellers about consumer preferences using 
channel-choice information in addition to the search and purchase activities.  
1.7.1 The Optimal Pricing Policy on Two Channels 
In the first counterfactual, we study how sellers can utilize the information revealed by the 
consumer channel choice by offering different prices across channels. In practice, sellers can offer 
mobile-only prices for consumers using their smartphones to shop. With different prices on mobile 
and PC, in equilibrium, consumers will consider the price distribution on both channels and select 
channels accordingly. Therefore, channel-specific prices will also lead to changes in the pool of 
customers on both channels. Using our estimated model, we calculate the new equilibrium 
situation where sellers set different prices on PC and mobile and consumers have rational 
expectations of the price distribution, which influences their channel-choice decisions.  
To find the optimal channel-specific prices, we need to estimate the marginal cost of sellers 
and the consumer demand function. This approach allows us to find the equilibrium condition, in 
which sellers set prices accounting for the customer base on both channels and, additionally, 
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consumers choose a channel considering the channel-specific price distribution. Our dataset 
contains more than 100 different products. Recovering the marginal cost for each one is 
computationally infeasible. We focus on the top 10 products, which account for more than 60% of 
the total sales during the data period. The prices of these products range from ¥117 to ¥208 
(US$17.6 to $31.2).  
To estimate the marginal cost of each seller, we assume the observed prices are the 
equilibrium prices when sellers can only choose the same price level for both channels. We first 
estimate the consumer demand function. The demand of product 𝑗 with price 𝑝" in channel s is 
𝐷(_𝑝"` = 𝜋( ∙ f∑ 𝜋+(=+62 	 ∙
+
7
∙ 𝑃s𝑈+(_𝑝"` > max_𝑈+(_𝑝:"+ `, 0`uk,   (13) 
where 𝜋( is the proportion of consumers who choose channel 𝑠. 𝜋+( is the proportion of consumers 
searching 𝑏  products on channel s . They search product j  with probability +
7
, where 𝑁  is the 
number of all available products. 𝑈+(_𝑝"`	denotes the utility of product 𝑗 for consumers who search 
𝑏 times on channel 𝑠 minus the outside option value. A consumer chooses to purchase 𝑗 if and only 
if the utility is higher than the utility of all other products browsed 𝑈+((𝑝:"+ ), and is larger than 0 
(i.e., buying product 𝑗 is more appealing than leaving without a purchase).  
To evaluate 𝐷(_𝑝"`, we draw the error terms in the model and simulate consumer search 
and purchase decisions using the model parameters. With the simulation results, we estimate 𝜋( 
and 𝜋+( by the corresponding average values. For consumers who search 𝑏 times on channel 𝑠, we 
evaluate the probability that product 𝑗 offers the highest utility. For each product 𝑗, we obtain price 
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draws for the other 𝑏 − 1 products, as well as their individual match values.14 With 1,000 sets of 
draws, we approximate the probability 𝑃s𝑈+(_𝑝"` > max_𝑈+(_𝑝:"+ `, 0`u  by its corresponding 
sample average.  
We calculate the demand function by changing 𝑝"  from 0 to ¥1000, which covers all 
observed prices in our dataset. Figure 1.5 plots the demand functions for PC (black dashed line) 
and mobile (grey solid line). The demand on PC is higher than on mobile at any given price, due 
to the self-selection by which consumers on PC are likely to have higher valuation of the product 
category than those on mobile. On both channels, price elasticity of demand is larger for moderate 
prices. When price is very low, demand is bounded above by the probability of the product being 
browsed. When price is very high, demand converges to 0 because the utility is likely to be lower 
than that of the other products or the outside option.  
 
Figure 1.5 The Estimated Demand Function on PC and Mobile 
 
14 Note the individual match value e'( is only realized after consumer 𝑖 searches product 𝑗. This is different from search 
models (e.g., Honka 2014) where consumers know all the individual match values prior to search. In our model setting, 
the distribution of 𝑒)* is not subject to selection. Similarly, prices are also realized after search. Therefore, we can take 





























With the demand function, we then infer the marginal cost for product 𝑗 assuming that, 
given the prices of other sellers, the observed price maximizes the seller profit when the seller sets 
a single price for both channels. The marginal cost for seller 𝑗 𝑚𝑐" satisfies the condition 




where 𝑅(𝑝" , 𝑚𝑐") is the profit function for product 𝑗 with price 𝑝" and marginal cost 𝑚𝑐". With 
the profit-maximizing assumption that observed price ?̂?" maximizes the seller’s profit, we estimate 
the marginal costs for the top 10 sellers.15  
Instead of a single price on both channels, sellers can charge channel-specific prices to 
maximize profits. Seller 𝑗 chooses prices 𝑝"' on mobile and 𝑝"2	on PC to maximize his expected 
profit as a function of the two prices and marginal cost: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥>+$,>+%𝑅_𝑝"
', 𝑝"2, 𝑚𝑐"` =r_𝑝"( −𝑚𝑐"`𝐷((𝑝")
(
, 
where 𝐷((𝑝")  is the channel-specific demand function under the new counterfactual prices. 
Consumers form rational expectations of the new price distributions on both channels, which will 
affect consumers’ channel choice. For example, if prices on mobile are lower than on PC, more 
consumers will choose the mobile channel, which will further influence the seller’s optimal prices 
on both channels. To find the equilibrium, we iterate between sellers choosing channel-specific 
prices given consumer channel choice, and consumers choosing a channel given channel-specific 
 
15 We assume the remaining sellers keep their original uniform pricing on both channels in the counterfactual exercise. 
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prices. The process converges when the changes in channel-specific prices are less than 0.1 
between iterations. 
We find that when sellers charge channel-specific prices, the optimal price on mobile is 
lower than that on PC. Across the top 10 sellers, the average optimal price on mobile is ¥163.94, 
which is lower than the original uniform price at ¥165.74, whereas the optimal price on PC is 
¥168.43, which is higher than the original price. On average, the price on mobile is lower by ¥4.49 
(95% confidence interval: ¥3.73 – ¥5.11) or 2.7%. For the top 10 sellers, the optimal price on 
mobile is always lower than that on PC, with the magnitude of difference ranging from 1% to 4% 
across the sellers. With prices becoming lower on mobile under channel-specific prices, the 
conversion rate on mobile increases from 12.51% to 12.85% (or 2.7% in relative terms). We see 
the opposite story on PC where the prices become higher under channel-specific prices, and the 
overall conversion rate decreases from 16.35% to 16.10% (or 1.5% in relative terms). The overall 
pattern of a higher conversion rate on PC than on mobile continues, although the gap becomes 
slightly smaller. With channel-specific prices, sellers are able to make higher profits than under 
uniform pricing on both channels. Overall, the average profit increases by 0.55% (95% confidence 
interval: 0.06% – 0.70%) for the top 10 sellers.  
To summarize, we find the optimal prices on mobile is 2.7% lower than that on PC. The 
proposed model considers the differences in search pattern and conversion rate on PC and mobile 
and shows that prices should be lower on the mobile channel, because of the lower valuation for 
consumers shopping on the channel. Ignoring consumer self-selection between the two channels 
can lead to incorrect channel-specific prices. 
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1.7.2 Optimal Retargeting Strategy for Sellers 
In the second counterfactual, we investigate a retargeting strategy by offering coupons to 
consumers who have browsed but have not purchased. Similar to the first counterfactual, we 
consider the different pools of consumers on mobile and PC. However, consumers who abandon 
the search without purchase are systematically different from the total consumer population 
targeted in the first counterfactual (see Jiang et al. 2019). We focus on how sellers can use the 
channel choice information to offer optimal channel-specific coupons to attract consumers who 
have browsed without purchase. Such a retargeting strategy can be economically impactful 
because as many as 85% of consumers browse without making a purchase. 
We calculate the optimal coupon values offered to retargeted consumers on mobile and PC. 
To focus on how the channel choice provides valuable information for sellers, we assume sellers 
know which channel consumers chose but not which products they have browsed. Seller 𝑗 chooses 
the coupon value 𝑥 on each channel to maximize the expected profit 𝑟"(𝑥): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥?𝑟"(𝑥) = ∑ _𝑝" −𝑚𝑐" − 𝑥`𝐵"((𝑥)𝐼(,(    (14) 
where 𝑝" −𝑚𝑐" − 𝑥 represents the profit for seller 𝑗 considering the marginal cost (estimated in 
the first counterfactual) and coupon value 𝑥. 𝐵"((𝑥) denotes the purchase probability on channel 𝑠 
for seller 𝑗  when he offers a coupon value 𝑥  (the estimation procedure is described later). 𝐼( 
represents the number of consumers who browsed without purchase.16  
 
16 We assume consumers do not anticipate the retargeting coupon (i.e., they will not choose to search and abandon in 
order to get a retargeting coupon). Therefore, the percentage of non-purchasers 𝐼, does not change when the coupon 
value 𝑥 varies.  
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We calculate the purchase probability 𝐵"((𝑥)  using simulation. We assume that when 
sending the coupons, sellers also provide detailed product information including price. Therefore, 
retargeted consumers do not need to search for the information and pay the search costs again. 
Using the estimated model, we simulate consumer channel-choice, search, and purchase decisions 
by drawing 𝑄 = 50  times from the error-term distributions and price distribution for each 
consumer. Let 𝐼(,9  be the number of consumers who do not make a purchase on channel 𝑠 at 
simulation 𝑞, and 𝑎8-,/ is the overall category valuation for these non-purchasers, whose outside 
option value is 𝑒'8-,/ and the individual match value toward seller 𝑗 is 𝑒"8-,/. 









where the numerator calculates the number of non-purchasers who will make a purchase after 
receiving coupon 𝑥 . Dividing it by the total number of non-purchasers, we get the purchase 
probability for the retargeting coupon 𝑥. 𝐵"((𝑥) represents the expected purchase probability when 
seller 𝑗 sends a coupon worth value 𝑥 to retarget consumers on channel 𝑠. 
With estimated 𝐵"((𝑥), we calculate the optimal coupon value 𝑥 for seller 𝑗 on PC and 
mobile given its original price and marginal cost. Similar to the first counterfactual, we focus on 
the top 10 sellers. We find the optimal retargeting coupon value is higher for consumers on mobile 
than on PC. The optimal coupon value for mobile consumers is ¥5.11 (about 3% of the original 
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price) and ¥4.81 for PC consumers. The difference in the coupon values is about ¥0.3 (or 6%) 
between the two channels with a 95% confidence interval from ¥0.0076 to ¥0.6057. 
With the retargeting coupon, sellers can improve profits by 9.97% on the mobile channel, 
and by 10.05% on PC. The overall expected profit increases by 10.01%. We compare it with a 
scenario where sellers do not know the consumers’ channel choice. Sellers can only set one 
retargeting coupon value for all non-purchasers, regardless of their chosen channel. The optimal 
coupon value in this case is ¥4.92. The overall expected profit is lower by 5.1% than the profit 
under channel-specific coupons. This finding demonstrates how online sellers can utilize the 
channel-choice information for a more effective promotional strategy such as sending out 
retargeting coupons.  
To summarize, we find sellers’ profit increase is higher when they offer channel-specific 
retargeting coupons than when channel choice is not considered. The optimal coupon value is 
higher for consumers on mobile than on PC. The result is consistent with that in the first 
counterfactual, which suggests a lower optimal price on mobile than on PC. Both results are driven 
by the difference in what types of consumers will self-select to browse on mobile phones or PCs. 
1.8 Conclusions and Limitations 
In this paper, we develop a model of consumer channel choice in addition to search and purchase. 
The proposed model can explain an intriguing phenomenon whereby, although more consumers 
use mobile phones to shop, the conversion rate is significantly lower than that on PCs. We find the 
PC channel has a lower marginal search cost but a higher fixed search cost than the mobile channel. 
Consumers with higher product valuation are more likely to use the PC channel because they have 
a higher search intensity and will benefit from the lower marginal search cost. Consumers with 
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lower product valuation, on the other hand, are more likely to choose the mobile channel because 
of its lower fixed cost to start a shopping session.  
The estimated model allows us to study channel-specific marketing strategies for sellers. 
We find the optimal price on mobile is 2.7% lower than on PC. For non-purchasers, the optimal 
retargeting coupon value is 6% higher for consumers on mobile than on PC. Overall, sellers’ profit 
will increase if their marketing strategies are channel specific. Both counterfactual analyses 
demonstrate how the proposed model can provide sellers with important managerial insights. 
Ignoring consumer self-selection between the two channels can lead to incorrect channel-specific 
marketing strategies. 
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. From a methodological prospective, we 
propose a flexible framework that incorporates endogenous consumer channel choice in addition 
to the search and purchase decisions. The proposed model can capture the observed search 
activities and purchase decisions on both channels. From a managerial perspective, our results 
offer guidance to sellers on the optimal channel-specific marketing strategies. We consider 
channel-specific prices and retargeting coupons and show how they should be different on the two 
channels.  
Like all research, our study has limitations. First, the optimal channel-specific prices and 
marketing strategies are from counterfactual analysis using one product category on Taobao. We 
call for future research to further test these recommendations with actual field experiments. They 
should also be tested with a broader range of product categories and in different countries for 
generalizability. Second, our proposed model makes several strong assumptions on consumer 
search and purchase behaviors. In particular, we assume consumers use simultaneous search 
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strategy. Future research with richer datasets should further explore consumers’ channel choice in 
other scenarios, such as when consumers use sequential search and when they have prior 
knowledge on the differentiated quality of sellers. Results on how consumers who choose to shop 
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Chapter 2  
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Strategic 
Self-Control in Digital Content Consumption 
Co-authored with Tat Y. Chen, Xueming Luo and Xiaoyi Wang 
2.1 Introduction 
Consumers widely embrace digital content, such as social media, videos, music, and books. 
According to a report from eMarketer,17 adults in the United States on average spent 6 hours and 
19 minutes per day on digital media in 2018, overtaking the time spent on traditional media for the 
first time. Online video has been the main driver of this phenomenon. Netflix, for example, gained 
more than 700 million subscribers in just four years from 2013 to 2017. Demand for other content 
has also significantly increased. The rapid growth in the consumption of digital content has raised 
concerns about the mental and physical well-being of consumers. Research on consumer digital 
content consumption decisions (e.g., Zhang et al. 2012; Boumosleh and Jaalouk, 2017) has shown 
that when consumers indulge themselves inside the fantasy world created by video games, online 
videos, and web fictions, they can lose self-control and spend more time and money than they 
originally intended to. Other consequences include various mental and physical problems. Such 
over-consumption behavior has been categorized as a clinical disorder in China since 2008.18 
Being aware of the negative implications of over-consumption may induce consumers to conduct 
self-control strategies in advance. Wertenbroch (1998), for example, documents that smokers may 
 
17 Source: https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-time-spent-with-media-2018. 
18 Source: https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2008/nov/11/china-internet. 
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purchase small cigarette packets, to curb future smoking. This strategy may also be used to control 
over-consumption in digital content. 
The goal of our study is to examine consumers’ digital content consumption behaviors and 
their self-control strategies. We focus on a specific type of digital content—web fiction. Web 
fiction is available primarily on the Internet, usually released serially by chapters daily. Reading 
web fiction is prevalent among Asian consumers: according to a report, more than 400 million 
unique readers in China pay for some form of web fiction. A successful web fiction writer can earn 
more than 16 million dollars.19 The market size in China reached 18 billion RMB20 in 2018.21 We 
use a unique dataset obtained from a major digital book platform in China that provides the content 
to subscribers. We observe several unique data features that are related to our research goal. First, 
individual consumers, on average, read about 500 chapters per month, with one-fourth reading 
1,500 chapters in average. Assuming one chapter takes five minutes to read,22 reading time per 
month is 42 hours for an average consumer and 125 hours for the top one-fourth, indicating 
individuals spend as much time on web fictions as on other digital media.23 Second, web fiction is 
different from literary fiction. It enables readers to immerse themselves in “fantasy pleasure” and 
can cause withdrawal symptoms when they try to stop reading.24 Further, as payment from the 
online platform to authors is linked to how many chapters an individual reads, authors have an 
inherent incentive to include plot twists to keep readers following their books every day. These 
 
19 Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/asia/china-online-literature-zhang-wei.html 
20 One RMB is about 0.15 US dollar. 
21 Source: “2018 China Digital Reading Market Industry Report” by ASKCI Consulting, 2018. Another article from 
Forbes described the rapid growth of web fictions in China that challenges Amazon’s Kindle (see 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jinshanhong/2017/07/17/chinas-online-reading-craze-is-so-big-its-challenging-
amazons-kindle/#7c48709f4a8c). 
22 A chapter contains about 1,000 Chinese characters  
23 An average Chinese adult spent nearly 4 hours a day (120 hours per month) on digital media. (Source: 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/china-time-spent-with-media-2019) 
s24 Source: http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-DDWT201701036.htm 
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features may cause consumers to read more than they intend to regularly. Finally, we observe an 
interesting overpaying phenomenon among consumers: to read web fictions, an individual can 
choose either a pay-per-chapter plan (0.1 RMB for each chapter) or a monthly subscription plan 
(12 RMB each month). Anyone who reads more than 120 chapters under the former plan or fewer 
than 120 chapters under the latter plan will overpay for the reading. We find that, while only 6% 
of consumers overpay by choosing the monthly subscription, one-third of consumers consistently 
overpay by choosing the pay-per-chapter plan. Among consumers who overpay, 60% switch plans 
later if they are under the monthly subscription, but only 20% switch under the pay-per-chapter 
plan. Furthermore, most switchers from the monthly subscription (including those who do not 
overpay) continue to read a lot after switching, implying that the monetary cost would have been 
significantly lower had they not switched. We argue that these overpaying behaviors are consistent 
with the idea that consumers use strategic self-control measures to curb over-consumption, which 
can have negative long-term consequences.  
To formalize the idea, we propose a dynamic structural model that allows consumers to 
have different consumption preferences during the reading plan and consumption choice stages. It 
characterizes a type of “time-inconsistent” preferences that can lead to over-consumption 
behavior. Such time-inconsistent preferences apply to not only digital content consumption 
behaviors but also other types of behaviors such as gambling, use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. 
Furthermore, the model allows for habit formation, as reading more today may increase the reading 
preference (leading to reading even more) in the future. Anticipating the potential downsides of 
the time-inconsistent preferences and habit formation, rational consumers will impose strategic 
self-controls. One of the strategies is to choose a reading plan that will help curb their future 
reading, even though doing so could incur a higher monetary cost. This decision implies that a 
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forward-looking consumer, when choosing a plan, plays a game against the myopic self during the 
consumption stage. 
We first use an analytical model to illustrate this argument. We show that, given a set of 
model parameters and state of reading preference, a unique equilibrium exists. We also show that, 
under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium will converge globally to one of the three steady 
states: (1) consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan, and stay at a low reading preference; (2) 
consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan and remain at a medium state; and (3) consumers pay 
monthly subscription and stay at a high state. Depending on the utility parameters, we show that 
overpaying by choosing the pay-per-chapter plan can be optimal. We further show that the standard 
recursive method that solves the optimal policy function in the dynamic programming literature 
can be used in our model, even though the agent exhibits time-inconsistent preferences.  
We then construct an econometric model for the empirical analysis by incorporating 
unobservable and individual heterogeneities. Estimation results show that, out of the three latent 
segments of consumers, the first segment is more price-sensitive and has a higher non-monetary 
cost of over-consumption. Interestingly, despite being more price-sensitive, this segment actually 
overpays for the consumption due to the self-control reason. In contrast, segment 2 is less likely 
to overpay, and about half of the segment chooses the monthly subscription plan. Segment 3 is 
small in size; it has the highest reading preference and is most likely to select the monthly 
subscription plan.  
The findings of this study can have substantive implications not only for public 
policymakers but also for producers and distributors of digital content. We use counterfactuals to 
study the impacts of pricing plans on consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. We find that if 
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the platform were to eliminate the pay-per-chapter plan that helps curb consumption, not only 
would it hurt consumer welfare but also its profit, which would drop by 76%. On the other hand, 
if the platform were to eliminate the monthly subscription that encourages more consumption, its 
profit would increase by 46%, whereas consumer welfare only decreases by 4.5%. Finally, we find 
that introducing a new nonlinear pricing plan with volume surcharge can simultaneously improve 
the platform’s profit by 46% (almost the same as eliminating the monthly subscription) and the 
consumer welfare by 2.5%. It also dominates another nonlinear pricing plan with volume discount 
on both dimensions. Overall, our results show that in contrast to the common belief that firms 
should offer pricing plans that encourages consumption (e.g., monthly subscription only), offering 
a plan that helps curb consumption (e.g., pay-by-chapter and volume surcharge) can increase the 
firm profit when consumers have the motivation of self-control. It highlights the necessity of 
considering consumers’ self-control behaviors when marketing managers design the pricing 
structure for digital content distribution.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related literature. We 
describe the data and present some empirical data patterns in section 2.3 to motivate our modeling 
approach. Section 2.4 describes our structural model and estimation strategy. Section 2.5 presents 
the estimation and counterfactual results. Finally, section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature  
This study is related to the literature on time inconsistency, a concept first formally introduced by 
Strotz (1956). Because preferences evolve over time, the optimal choice today may not be the best 
in the future. Since Strotz (1956), numerous experimental and empirical studies have shown 
different forms of time inconsistency (see Loewenstein and O'donoghue, 2002 for a summary). An 
example of time inconsistency is hyperbolic discounting, that is, the discounting rate is much 
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higher for future outcomes. Hyperbolic discounting has found support in numerous studies using 
experiment or field data (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Redelmeier and Heller, 1993; 
Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996; Pender, 1996). Previous literature has also shown 
other forms of time inconsistency, for example, the “sign effect,” whereby consumers value future 
loss more than gains (Mischel et al., 1969; Yates and Watts, 1975; Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et 
al., 1989; MacKeigan et al., 1993; Redelmeier and Heller, 1993), and the “magnitude effect,” 
whereby consumers discount small numbers more than large numbers (Thaler, 1981; Ainslie and 
Haendel, 1983; Kirby and Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et al., 1989; Green et al., 1994a, 1994b; 
Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Kirby, 1997). We model how individuals may ignore the consumption 
cost during the consumption stage, although they are fully rational when choosing the price plan. 
This is consistent with the general definition of time inconsistency in Strotz (1956) but is different 
from a typical hyperbolic discounting model setting.  
Given the ubiquitous evidence of time-inconsistent behaviors, theoretical and empirical 
researchers have further studied to what extent consumers use self-control strategies to solve this 
problem, mostly in the form of hyperbolic discounting. Laibson (1997), for example, constructs a 
theory to show how dynamically inconsistent preferences could incentivize consumers to constrain 
their future choice. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) also use theoretical models to study how 
individuals self-control when the cost and reward of consumer decisions do not realize at the same 
time. Other studies also examine how consumers can achieve self-control by restricting the 
opportunity for additional purchases (Rachlin, 1995), or reducing temptation through substitution 
(Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). The concept of time inconsistency has also been adopted in 
empirical studies to explain various types of consumer behaviors that seem to be inconsistent with 
classical economic theories. Wertenbroch (1998), for example, uses both experiment and field data 
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to show how consumers strategically ration the purchased quantity to restrict excessive 
consumption. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) find from data that individuals overpay for a 
gym membership. They argue that this overpaying is a strategy to increase future gym use. We 
study a similar behavior; however, we show that consumers overpay to curb over-consumption 
that will result in future utility loss. Gruber and Köszegi (2001) develop a utility function with 
time inconsistency and addictive consumption behaviors. Due to the technical barrier of estimating 
such a dynamic model, they calibrate model parameters to show that, due to smokers’ time-
inconsistent preferences, the optimal cigarette tax should be higher than under the time-consistent 
assumption. Our study makes both methodological and substantive contributions to this stream of 
literature. On the methodological side, Caplin and Leahy (2006) have shown that the standard 
recursive iteration method cannot be applied to time inconsistency models when more than three 
time periods exist. They further suggest that equilibrium may not exist. We show that a unique 
equilibrium exists in our model setting and can be computed using the recursive method. Future 
researchers could use our method to study other types of time-inconsistent consumer behaviors in 
a wide range of markets, including other digital contents and traditional product categories (e.g., 
tobacco, alcohol, and drugs). For the substantive contribution, we use counterfactuals to study the 
impacts of marketing actions on firms’ profit and consumer welfare. The implications will be 
entirely different without considering the consumer strategic self-control induced by time-
inconsistent preferences. 
The reason behind time-inconsistent preferences can be related to additive consumption. 
The theory of rational addiction in Becker and Murphy (1988) is based on the assumption that 
consumers can evaluate the monetary and non-monetary benefits and costs from consumption. 
This theory has been adopted in later empirical research studying different consumption behaviors, 
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including cigarettes (Chaloupka, 1991; Becker et al., 1994), alcohol (Baltagi and Griffin, 2002), 
drugs (Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998; Liu et al., 1999; Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996), and 
gambling (Mobilia, 1993). Arcidiacono et al. (2007) study how forward-looking consumers make 
decisions for consuming alcohol and tobacco.25 Researchers have also investigated addiction in 
social media consumption, Internet browsing, and mobile apps usage (e.g., Young, 1998; Pelling 
and White, 2009; Wan, 2009; Kuss and Griffiths, 2011; Kwon et al. 2016). Our model differs from 
the rational addiction literature, as we allow consumers to be myopic during the consumption stage 
and ignorant of the cost of over-consumption. This is consistent with the medical research (e.g., 
Nestler, 2013) which argues that, because consumption is intrinsically rewarding, consumers may 
not correctly evaluate the short- and long-term costs during consumption. A recent study on 
addictive usage of smartphones by Boumosleh and Jaalouk (2017) also finds users usually do not 
consider health consequences during usage. However, following Becker and Murphy (1988), we 
allow consumers to form expectations about their future consumption when choosing the price 
plan.  
2.3 Data  
Our data come from a major digital book platform in China. The data sample includes the reading 
activity from 11,346 unique consumers, randomly selected among the existing subscribers of the 
platform, for six months from January to June 2017. The platform offers a rich collection of web 
fictions. Unlike online books provided by Amazon Kindle, web fictions are mostly written by 
amateurs. They are primarily published online, updated daily by chapters. The length of each book 
 
25 In marketing, researchers have documented addictive cigarette consumption and the consequences of a cigarette 
tax on demand (Chen, Sun, and Singh, 2009; Wang et al., 2015). Gordon and Sun (2015) use a dynamic model of 




varies depending on whether it attracts readership. A complete one could easily exceed a thousand 
chapters. Each chapter is usually about 1,000 to 5,000 Chinese characters, requiring a few minutes 
of reading time. Distinct from literary fictions, which typically refer to fictions with literary merit, 
web fictions are classified by genres such as fantasy, romance, and science. Readers follow web 
fictions for entertainment, a riveting story, and escape from reality. Given that each chapter is 
short, consumers often read multiple books each day. This is different from the “binge-watch” 
behavior, wherein consumers spend a short period on intensively watching a whole season of TV 
series and then stop. 
The platform offers two pricing plans for readers: pay-per-chapter and monthly 
subscription. The prices are 0.1 RMB for each chapter under the former plan, and 12 RMB under 
the latter.26 Under the pay-per-chapter plan, readers have to swipe a bar on their mobile phones to 
confirm the payment before reading each chapter. Under the monthly subscription, readers receive 
a text reminder for the payment due a few days before the subscription expires. If readers stop the 
subscription, they are automatically switched to the pay-per-chapter plan. 
Each period is a month in our analysis. The number of chapters an individual reads in a 
month represents his/her consumption level. Because readers start and end monthly subscriptions 
at different times, we make an assumption when constructing the dataset: If a reader starts a 
subscription before the 15th of a month, we assume he/she starts the subscription at the beginning 
 
26 These prices are equivalent to US $0.015 for each chapter and $1.80 for each month. 
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of this month; otherwise, his/her subscription starts at the beginning of next month. We tried 
different data-construction methods and found robust results.27  
2.3.1 Consumption Behaviors in Data 
We use the data to examine consumers’ reading behaviors. We first present an overview of the 
reading amount, then look at whether there is a habit formation that is well-known in the marketing 
literature. Habit formation is characterized as past consumption enhancing the current 
consumption preference, thus creating dynamics in reading behaviors. Next, we investigate 
possible time-inconsistent preferences exhibited from the consumption and plan choice stages. 
Finally, we examine the evidence that consumers use self-control strategies. These are the two 
important components in our dynamic structural model. 
Table 2.1 Reading Amount 
Reader group Monthly reading (chapter) Percentage of Population 
Overall 506.4 100.00% 
Pay-per-Chapter 392.19 74.51% 
Monthly Subscription 827.06 25.49% 
Overpay for Monthly Subscription 45.92 6.60% 
Overpay for Paid-per--by-Chapter 836.03 34.16% 
 
 
27 For example, we change the date to the 7th or 23rd in each month, and find the data patterns that we present below remain 
similar. In the data, 84% of consumers change plans in the first or last week of a month; therefore, using different cut-off dates 
does not affect the results.  
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Table 2.1 presents a glimpse of the consumption level. The first row shows that an average 
consumer reads about 500 chapters per month. Assuming consumers spend five minutes reading 
each chapter, this amount represents spending 2,500 minutes per month reading web fiction, or 83 
minutes per day. Furthermore, 25% of consumers in the data read more than 700 chapters in a 
month, implying they spend about 60 hours a month, or almost two hours each day. If the average 
workday is eight hours, the above statistics suggest that in a month, the reading time is equivalent 
to 5.2 working days for an average consumer, and 7.5 working days for the top 25%. These suggest 
that the non-monetary costs (e.g., time cost and other adverse consequences) of reading could be 
very significant. A report from eMarketer shows that US adults, on average, spent 379 minutes per 
day on digital media in 2018. Broken down by format, consumers spend 51 minutes per day on 
video games28 and 135 minutes on social media.29 The comparison suggests reading web fictions 
is as time-consuming as other digital contents.  
We test whether increasing exposure from past consumption will increase the current 
consumption in our data. Following the model in Becker and Murphy (1994), we specify the habit 
stock as an accumulation of past consumption under depreciation. Denoting the state of individual 
i in month t as ℎ!@, the depreciation rate as 𝛿, and the consumption as 𝑐!@, the habit stock evolves 
as the following: 
ℎ!,@32 = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ + 𝑐!@ .       (1) 
To test the relationship between the habit stock and consumption, we run an ordinary least 
squares regression with the reading amount (from second to the last month) as the dependent 
 
28 Source: https://www.limelight.com/resources/white-paper/state-of-online-gaming-2018/#spend 
29 Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-social-media-usage-worldwide 
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variable and the habit stock in the previous month as an independent variable. Because the habit 
stock cannot be directly observed in the data, we calculate it in equation (1), restricting the value 
of 𝛿 with a lower bound at 0.36, as suggested by Becker and Murphy (1990). We also assume 
every consumer starts at ℎ!2 = 0 in the first month. To control for the heterogeneity in reading 
preferences across consumers, we include individual fixed effects in the regression.  
Regression results show that the coefficients for ℎ!@ range from 0.05 to 0.005, and for 𝛿 
between 0.36 and 1. They are all significant at the 0.001 significance level. The results suggest 
that past consumption is positively correlated with future consumption.  
To show evidence of time-inconsistent preferences is less straightforward because we do 
not observe consumers’ utility during the plan choice and consumption stages. Our strategy is to 
show inconsistencies between the pricing plan consumers choose and their reading amount, as 
indirect support of the assumption. The second and third rows of Table 2.1 show that the majority 
(three-fourth) of consumers choose the pay-per-chapter plan, and as expected, the number of 
chapters these consumers read is lower than those read by consumers who choose the monthly 
subscription plan. What is surprising is that the average number of chapters read by the consumers 
is 392, significantly higher than the 120 chapters over which the optimal plan choice should be a 
monthly subscription. Furthermore, the last two rows of Table 2.1 show that the majority of 
consumers who overpay choose the pay-per-chapter plan. Their average reading amount is 836 
chapters, similar to consumers who choose the monthly subscription plan. All these numbers 
suggest that the reading amount of the majority of consumers who choose the pay-per-chapter plan 




Finally, we look for supporting evidence for the strategic self-control assumption. 
Assuming consumers know that during consumption, they will not sufficiently consider the costs, 
they will have an incentive to take actions during the plan choice stage to curb future consumption. 
The most striking data pattern is the proportion of consumers who overpay under the pay-per-
chapter and monthly subscription plan, as shown in Table 2.1. Over one-third of consumers 
overpay by reading too much under the pay-per-chapter plan, whereas only 6.6% consumers 
overpay by reading too little under the monthly subscription plan. For the former consumers, the 
reading amount is 836 chapters, far higher than the 120 chapters beyond which they should choose 
the monthly subscription. The asymmetric overpay ratios of consumers under the two pricing plans 
are consistent with the assumption that consumers strategically choose the pay-per-chapter plan to 
curb their future consumption.  
Table 2.2 Probability of Switching Plans 
Switching from Overall Overpay No overpay 
Pay-per-Chapter 17.55% 22.65% 12.45% 
Monthly Subscription 46.43% 58.44% 34.41% 
 
Table 2.2 offers further evidence in support of the strategic self-control assumption. The 
first column reports the probabilities that consumers switch away from the plan they chose last 
month. The proportion of consumers who switch away from monthly subscription is far larger than 
those who switch away from pay-per-chapter. The next column shows that for consumers who 
overpay for pay-per-chapter (by reading too much), only 22.7% switch to the monthly 
subscription, whereas the switching probability for those who overpay for the monthly subscription 
(by reading too little) is 58.4%. The high switch probability for monthly subscription suggests 
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consumers pay attention to the monetary cost and adjust the pricing plan accordingly. The low 
switch probability for pay-per-chapter, on the other hand, implies consumers are willing to incur 
a higher monetary cost to curb future consumption. 
  
Figure 2.1 Number of Chapters Read after Switching to Pay-per-Chapter 
Variables  Meaning 
Always subs: Consumers who always purchase monthly 
subscription during the data time period 
Always chpt: Consumers who always choose pay-per-
chapter during the data time period 
Subs in xy:   Consumers who choose monthly subscription 


























Always subs Always chpt Subs in 12 Subs in 23 Subs in 34
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For self-control to work, one necessary assumption is that consumers are responsive to 
monetary cost during the consumption stage. We find from data that after a consumer switches to 
pay-per-chapter, the average reading amount drops from 794 to 395 chapters per month. Figure 
2.1 breaks down reading amount in the six months of the sample period by consumers who always 
choose the monthly subscription, always choose pay-per-chapter, and subscribe in months 1 and 
2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4, before they switch to pay-per-chapter. The figure shows that the 
consumption level of consumers who always choose monthly subscription increases over time 
(from 1,063 to 1,171 chapters). The consumption level of consumers who always choose pay-per-
chapter is steady between 200 and 300 chapters a month. The consumption level of consumers 
who switch from the monthly subscription to pay-per-chapter drops significantly after the switch. 
These data patterns suggest switching to pay-per-chapter helps curb consumption. Interestingly, 
we find these consumers still overpay for their reading after they switch. 
2.3.2 Alternative Explanations 
In this subsection, we examine whether several alternative explanations adopted from the past 
literature can explain the data patterns presented above. The first one is the rational addiction 
theory developed by Becker and Murphy (1988). The habit formation specification that we 
presented above is based on their work. However, they do not consider time-inconsistent 
preferences. Consequently, the consumption is optimal, and consumers will choose the pricing 
plan consistent with their consumption level. In this case, the asymmetrical pattern of overpaying 
we show in Table 2.1 should not exist. Therefore, we conclude that the rational addiction theory 
cannot explain why overpaying predominantly originates from pay-per-chapter consumers. Later, 
in the model estimation, we further show that without time inconsistency, the model fails to predict 
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the asymmetric overpaying behavior where a large proportion of consumers stay with their pay-
per-chapter plan and continue overpaying.  
Another alternative explanation is that because consumers first make the plan choice and then 
go through the consumption process, their reading preferences can experience random shocks in 
the second stage. This explanation still cannot explain the asymmetric overpay patterns. We use a 
simulation exercise for illustration. For each individual, we assume the reading amount follows an 
individual-specific normal distribution. Before making the pricing plan decision, the individual 
knows the distribution of his/her reading amount in the next period but not the exact amount and 
makes the plan choice that minimizes the expected cost based on the information. We run the 
simulation that draws from the empirical distribution of the reading amount for each individual. 
We find that the average overpay ratio for consumers who choose pay-per-chapter is about 11.7% 
compared with a significantly higher 17.9% for those who choose the monthly subscription. 
Overpaying for the monthly subscription is higher because the plan puts an upper bound on the 
monetary cost if a positive shock occurs in reading preferences. The result contradicts the empirical 
data pattern. The data pattern also rejects the risk aversion or option value explanation for 
consumers who choose not to switch to the monthly subscription. This is because the likelihood 
that a consumer reads fewer than 120 chapters per month is very small, but the probability that 
he/she reads a large amount is very substantial. A consumer should choose the monthly 
subscription if he/she is averse to overpaying. Likewise, choosing monthly subscription will have 
a higher option value (in the case he/she reads a lot in a month) than the pay-per-chapter plan.  
Consumer learning is another explanation. It argues that overpaying behavior can be a result 
of people learning about their true preferences over time. To test this explanation, we repeat the 
simulation described above, allowing each individual to update his/her belief of the mean reading 
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amount in each month based on the reading amount in the previous month. With the learning, the 
proportion of consumers overpaying is reduced under the two pricing plans; however, the 
overpaying ratio under monthly subscription is still higher than that under the pay-per-chapter 
plan. 
Table 2.3 Switching Probability after Overpay 
Consumer group Switch probability 
 Overpay for 1 months Overpay for 2 months Overpay for 3 months 
Overpay for Pay-per-
Chapter 22.65% 16.03% 4.95% 
Overpay for Monthly 
Subscription 58.44% 52.64% 27.64% 
 
Another way to test the learning story is to see how consumers adjust their pricing plans 
after overpaying. We calculate the average switch probabilities for consumers who overpay for 
one, two, and three months. The results are reported in Table 2.3. Even though consumers who 
choose pay-per-chapter predominantly overpay, their switching probabilities are consistently 
lower than those who choose the monthly subscription. Furthermore, the switch probabilities 
actually decline for those who overpay for a longer period. This clearly contradicts the learning 
story, which predicts consumers will adjust their choices accordingly over time. 
As another alternative explanation, consumer inattention suggests consumers are not aware 
they are overpaying. Table 2.2 shows the switching probability is high (58.4%) when consumers 
overpay under monthly subscription for the previous month. Only consumers who overpay under 
the pay-by-chapter plan do not switch. Consumer inattention cannot explain this asymmetric 
switching pattern. Furthermore, in our empirical context, consumers under pay-per-chapter have 
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to agree to pay 0.1 RMB each time they read a new chapter. Because they are constantly reminded 
of the payment, inattention does not seem to be the main reason behind the massive scale of 
overpaying for such a pricing plan.  
Transaction cost or consumer inertia as an alternative explanation for the asymmetric 
overpay patterns suggests that consumers find switching from pay-per-chapter to monthly 
subscription to be too costly. We do not have direct evidence to rule out such an explanation. In 
our empirical context, however, consumers are already registered users of the platform. Because 
they do not have to provide any personal information or change their payment method, consumers 
can switch with just one click. Given the average overpaying amount is more than four times the 
cost of a monthly subscription, transaction costs are unlikely to be the reason for not switching. 
One may argue that the costs are not about registration but are related to the effort of 
making payment. However, under the pay-per-chapter plan, consumers need to swipe the bar on 
their smartphones to pay for each chapter they read. Such effort is costlier than making one upfront 
payment for a monthly subscription. Again, the transaction cost explanation does not seem to hold 
in our empirical context. 
The asymmetric overpay pattern may be explained by the non-monetary benefit of pay-per-
chapter. For example, once a consumer pays for a chapter, he/she can always re-read the chapter, 
whereas that option is not available for the monthly subscription once he/she stops the subscription. 
This is not true in our context. Once the consumer pays for one chapter, he/she can only read it 
within 30 days. This restriction makes access to any chapter under pay-per-chapter identical to the 
monthly subscription. Another potential non-monetary benefit of pay-per-chapter for consumers 
lies in its option value, in the sense that consumers can always switch from pay-per-chapter to 
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monthly subscription but cannot freely switch back to pay-per-chapter within one subscription 
cycle (30 days). There can be a psychological benefit due to payment flexibility. We find from 
data that consumers who pay by chapters read on average 800 chapters per month, and more than 
80% of them never read below 120 chapters. Given the consistently high reading amount, 
consumers need to perceive an exceedingly large psychological benefit of the pay-per-chapter plan 
for them not to switch.  
Another alternative explanation, over-confidence, suggests that consumers overestimate 
their self-control ability in the future, and thus, underestimate the future reading amount. The 
assumption behind this is that they are naive time-inconsistent consumers who are not aware of 
how they will make choices during the consumption stage. Although this explanation cannot be 
completely ruled out, we find that it is not likely to be the main reason consumers overpay for their 
reading. The majority of those who overpay with pay-per-chapter continue with their plan for more 
than four months. It is unreasonable to assume that, after such a long time, consumers still believe 
that they can keep their reading amount below 120 chapters, when the actual average reading 
amount is consistently far higher than that. We should observe consumers to eventually switch to 
the monthly subscription. The same argument is made in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). As 
a more formal test, we estimate a model with naive time-inconsistent consumers. Estimation results 
suggest that consumers would need to underestimate future reading by an unreasonably large 
amount. Details are in the next section.  
The last potential explanation is that consumers do not care about the small price of 0.1 
RMB under pay-per-chapter and end up overpaying. In this case, we should not find consumers 
reduce their consumption after they switch from monthly subscription to pay-per-chapter. In our 
data, however, the average reading amount after consumers switch to pay-per-chapter drops from 
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794 to 395 chapters per month, suggesting their consumption is responsive to the price of each 
additional chapter they read.  
To conclude, although the alternative explanations we list above may explain some of the 
data patterns, they are inconsistent with either the asymmetric overpaying and switching patterns 
or the change in consumption behaviors in the data. We acknowledge that time-inconsistent 
preference and strategic self-control may not be the only mechanism driving the data observations; 
other potential behavioral explanations that we have not examined may still exist. 
 
2.4 The model and its Estimation 
In this section, we first use an analytical model to demonstrate under what conditions consumers 
will overpay as an optimal behavior. We then develop an econometric model with stochastic 
components and estimate the model from data. We discuss the estimation method and the model 
identification. 
2.4.1 An Analytical Model and Its Equilibrium 
In the dynamic programming literature, the recursive method has proved to be a useful tool to 
solve dynamic problems. When agents have time-inconsistent preferences, however, equilibrium 
may not be computed using the solution concept (e.g., Peleg and Yaari, 1973; Caplin and Leathy, 
2006), because value-function iteration may not converge, and thus the optimal policy function 
does not exist. Our model features both habit formation and time-inconsistent preferences under 
rational agent behavior. We show a unique equilibrium exists in the model. We further show the 
existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium. We characterize how the equilibrium varies 
depending on model parameters and the state of consumption stock. 
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In the model, a consumer chooses either pay-per-chapter (s = 0) or monthly subscription 
(s = 1) at the beginning of each period, then decides the level of consumption conditional on the 
chosen plan. The price for each chapter is 𝑝1  under pay-per-chapter, and 𝑝(  for the monthly 
subscription. The consumption utility is influenced by the habit stock, h. The utility during the 
consumption process is different from the utility when the consumer makes the pricing-plan 
choice. 
Starting with the utility function during consumption, we specify a quadratic utility 
function as follows: 
	𝑢1(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = (𝛼1 + 𝛼1A ∙ ℎ) ∙ 𝑐 − 𝛼11 ∙ 𝑐& − 𝜇 ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠 = 0} ∙ 𝑐	,               (2) 
where 𝑎1A captures how the habit stock h may change the marginal utility of consumption, and 𝜇 
is the price coefficient representing the marginal disutility of the monetary cost during the 
consumption stage. It only occurs if the consumer chooses pay-per-chapter; otherwise, the price 
of reading a chapter is zero. Given s and h, the consumer chooses the optimal 𝑐∗(𝑠, ℎ). It is 
straightforward to derive that 
																			𝑐∗(𝑠, ℎ) = -03-01∙A:D∙>0∙2{(6'}
&∙-00
	if	𝑐∗ ≥ 0, and	0	otherwise.                       (3) 
Suppose 𝜇 is positive. The optimal 𝑐∗ when s=0 is lower than that when s=1. 
Time-inconsistency in our model comes from consumers who, when choosing the pricing 
plan, consider the non-monetary costs of consumption (e.g., time, negative health impact from 
excessive smartphone usage) that they do not fully take into account in 𝑢1(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ). A difference in 
the monetary cost between the consumption stage and plan-choice stage can also exist (e.g., the 
consumer may care less about price once he/she has indulged in reading). We use 𝛾 to represent 
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the total difference in the marginal cost for reading each chapter. The utility function when the 
consumer chooses the pricing plan is specified as follows: 
                          	𝑢>(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = 𝑢1(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐.                     (4) 
We assume the consumer is a “sophisticated” type, as proposed by Strotz (1956). That is, 
the consumer is aware that during consumption her choice is 𝑐∗(𝑠, ℎ) in equation (3) without the 
cost 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐. Furthermore, she is forward-looking as she considers how her current consumption can 
affect her future habit and thus the consumption. Formally, the consumer chooses a pricing plan 
by solving the following value function:  
𝑉(ℎ) = max
(
𝑢>(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝜇 ∙ 𝑝( ∙ 1{𝑠 = 1} + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ$) , (5) 
where  
ℎ$ = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ + 𝑐 (6) 
Equation (6) illustrates how the habit stock in the next period will evolve following the current 
consumption c.  
Because the utility function is continuous under either pricing plan, value function V is 
continuous in state space h. Assuming h is a compact set bounded above, for any parameter set, 
the contraction mapping theorem will hold so that the dynamic programming problem is 
guaranteed to have a unique fixed point for V. Therefore, for any h, a unique equilibrium exists in 
our model. This finding is different from other studies of time inconsistency in preferences, 
because we assume the consumer is myopic during the consumption stage. The optimal 
69 
 
consumption thus can be solved as in equation (3) and, as a result, the optimal plan choice in 
equation (5) is reduced to a standard dynamic programming problem.  
The unique optimal policy function that solves the dynamic problem in equation (5) is a 
















































































We use the standard recursive method to solve for the value function and the optimal policy 
function, and obtain the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Assuming parameters  𝛼1 , 𝛼1A , 𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝜆  are nonnegative, the following unique 
equilibrium exists:    
1A. If ℎ2(( ≤ ℎ2∗ < ℎ&((, 




1B. If ℎ&(( ≤ ℎ2∗ ,		 
	𝑠∗(ℎ) = 1	𝑓𝑜𝑟	ℎ > ℎ&
∗
0	𝑓𝑜𝑟	ℎ ≤ ℎ&∗
	   
1C. If ℎ2∗ < ℎ2((, 





Proof: See Appendix A.1.30 
Proposition 1 establishes that a unique equilibrium always exists. Depending on the 
parameter condition listed in 1A, 1B, and 1C, the cutoff points ℎ2∗, ℎ&∗ , and ℎ&∗∗ will vary, and thus 
the optimal plan choice will be different. Following the equilibrium plan choice, the consumption 
 
30 We require steady states to be nonnegative in the proof. This requirement is not necessary for the general setup.  
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level follows equation (3). Because now we have an analytical solution to our model, given an 
initial value h, we can predict how it will evolve and where the steady state is.  Based on 
Proposition 1, we can derive how the plan choice and consumption level will converge to the 
steady-state equilibrium as follows: 
Lemma: Based on Proposition 1, with any initial habit stock ℎ' , the following steady-state 
equilibria exist:  
i) if the condition in 1A is satisfied,  
lim
@→4
ℎ@ = ℎ2(( ∙ {ℎ' < ℎ2∗} + ℎ&(( ∙ {ℎ' ≥ ℎ2∗}; 
ii) if the condition in 1B is satisfied,  
lim
@→4
ℎ@ = ℎ2(( 
iii) if the condition in 1C is satisfied,  
lim
@→4
ℎ@ = ℎ&(( 
The lemma essentially guarantees all steady states are globally convergent steady states. 
Figure 2.2 provides a graphic illustration. In each panel of the figure, the x-axis denotes the current-
period habit stock, and the y-axis the next-period habit stock. The black solid line is the policy 
function which returns a unique value of next-period given current habit stock level, with arrows 
indicating how it evolves over time. The steady states are located at the intersection of the path 
and the 45-degree line, on which the state in the next period is the same as the current period.  
Under the condition in 1A in the top panel, if the habit stock starts below ℎ2∗, consumers will always 
choose pay-per-chapter, and h will converge to the “low” steady state ℎ2((; otherwise, they will 
choose the monthly subscription, and h will converge to the “high” steady state ℎ&((. In the second 
72 
 
panel, when the condition in 1B is satisfied, h will converge to the steady state ℎ2((, regardless of 
where the initial consumption stock state is. If the initial state ℎ' is very high (> ℎ&∗), consumers 
first choose monthly subscription, then switch to pay-per-chapter when h drops below ℎ&∗ . The gap 
on ℎ&∗  indicates the change in consumption level when they switch plans. The last panel in the 
figure demonstrates when the condition in 1C is satisfied. Regardless of where the initial 
consumption stock state is, consumers will eventually choose monthly subscription and converge 

















Figure 2.2 Dynamics of the Steady States 
When no time-inconsistency exists (either 𝛾 = 0 or 𝛾 ∙ 𝑐 also affects the utility function in 
the consumption stage), overpaying can never be the optimal choice. For any consumption amount 
above 𝑝( 𝑝1⁄  chapters, consumers should always choose the monthly subscription. Under time-
inconsistent preferences, however, consumers may overpay by choosing pay-per-chapter to 
prevent excessive consumption. The equilibrium characterized in proposition 1 provides a clear 
illustration on how time-inconsistent preferences and strategic self-control together can explain 
the unique data features we observe in section 2.3:  
1. Consumers overpay by consistently choosing pay-per-chapter: In the first two panels of 
Figure 2.2, consumers choose the plan at the steady-state equilibrium even though ℎ2(( can 
be at a level that is costlier for pay-per-chapter. 
2. Consumers switch to pay-per-chapter but still overpay: The second panel indicates 
consumers in a high state will switch from subscription to pay-per-chapter and decrease 
their consumption toward ℎ2((.	During the process, consumers may overpay for pay-per-
chapter. They may still overpay at the steady state ℎ2((.  









pay-per-chapter. It is easy to show that when consumers choose the monthly subscription 
(i.e., 𝑠∗(ℎ) = 1 in Proposition 1), their reading amount will never be below 𝑝( 𝑝1⁄  chapters 
a month.  
2.4.2 An Econometric Model  
In the analytical model, the plan choice and consumption level are deterministic. In reality, 
however, observed data will not be perfectly aligned with model predictions due to unobserved 
factors. To explain fluctuations in the plan choice and consumption across and within individuals, 
we construct an econometric model so that such fluctuations can be estimated from data. The 
model is similar to the analytical model, but it incorporates stochastic components in the utility 
functions. Furthermore, we allow heterogeneous model parameters across consumers to capture 
the fact that some consumers’ reading preferences can be systematically different from the others. 
And we also allow the non-monetary cost of reading web fiction to change given different level of 
habit stock h.31 For individual i in period t, the utility function during the consumption stage that 
corresponds to equation (2) is modified as follows: 
𝑢!@(𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@ , ℎ!@) = _𝛼!1 + 𝜔!@ + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@` ∙ 𝑐!@ − 𝛼!,11 ∙ 𝑐!@& − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0} ∙ 𝑐!@	(7)  
In this function, 𝜔!@	represents the unobserved factors that may affect the marginal utility 
of consumption in each period. The individual-specific model parameters capture the 
heterogeneity across consumers.  
The consumption level that corresponds to equation (3) therefore is  
 
31 Since such change of model setting do not affect the consumption stage decisions when compared to the baseline 
model, it is straightforward to see all essential model properties and proof are unaffected even if we apply such 
change into the analytical model we discussed in the last section. 
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Note the consumption level cannot be negative; therefore, 𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@) in equation (8) is bounded 
below by 0. 
For the marginal cost of reading each chapter, we allow 𝛾  (see equation 4) to be 
heterogeneous among consumers. In addition, we allow the cost to change as the habit state 
increases. That is, 𝛾!@ = 𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@. This setting implies that an individual’s time-inconsistency 
in terms of plan and consumption choices can be dynamically evolving.  
We assume that when making the plan choice, the consumer only knows the distribution 
of 𝜔!@ and not the exact value. The consumer will choose a plan that maximizes the expected value 
function. Two additional stochastic terms, 𝑒!@'  and 𝑒!@2 , will affect the utility of choosing pay-per-
chapter and monthly subscription, respectively. Corresponding to equations (5) and (6), the 
consumer’s dynamic problem of plan choice is specified as follows: 
𝑉!@(ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) = max(!36{',2}
𝐸P𝑢!@(𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ , ℎ!@), 𝑠!@ , ℎ!@) − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝( ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 1}   
−(𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@) ∙ 𝑐∗(𝑠!@ , ℎ!@) 
+𝑒!@' ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0} + 𝑒!@2 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 1} 
+𝛽 ∙ 𝐸P𝐸/𝑉!,@32_ℎ!,@32, 𝑒!,@32' , 𝑒!,@322 `,                (9) 
where  
																			ℎ!,@32 = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ + 𝑐∗(𝑠!@ , ℎ!@).                                                                      (10) 
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The expectation operator 𝐸P  in equation (9) integrates over 𝜔!@  and another 𝐸/  integrates over 
𝑒!,@32'  and 𝑒!,@322  in the next period. Given 𝜔!@ , the expected value function in the third line of 
equation (9) can be specified as 
𝐸/𝑉!,@32_ℎ!,@32, 𝑒!,@32' , 𝑒!,@322 ` = 𝐸/𝑚𝑎𝑥E𝑉!,@32' _ℎ!,@32, 𝑒!,@32' `, 𝑉!,@322 _ℎ!,@32, 𝑒!,@322 `F,         (11) 
where 𝑉!,@32'  and 𝑉!,@322  represent the value function conditional on choosing pay-per-chapter and 
monthly subscription, respectively. In the empirical application, we assume 𝜔!@ is distributed as 
𝑁(0, 𝜎P&) , where 𝜎P&  is the variance, and is independent and identically distributed across 
consumers and periods. Furthermore, 𝑒!@'  and 𝑒!@2  are extreme-value type I distributed with zero 
location parameter and a scale parameter 𝜏.  
In the value function, the state variable is ℎ!@. Suppose the state space is a closed interval 
on ℛ2 denoted by [0, H]. We discretized the state space into N grid points, and assume ℎ!@  is 




] , where 𝑘 ∈ {1,… ,𝑁} . Based on the distribution 
assumption of 𝜔!@ and our model setting, we can derive that given the plan choice 𝑠!@ and current 
state ℎ!@ , the conditional distribution of ℎ!,@32  follows a truncated normal distribution 𝑔  with 
support on [0,H], with mean 𝜇(ℎ!@ , 𝑠!@) = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ!@ +
%!03%!,01∙A!3:D!∙>0∙2{(!36'}
&∙%!,00




. The distribution satisfies the Markov property of memorylessness. Let 𝜃 be the 
collection of model parameters. The distribution function of ℎ!,@32, unconditional on 𝑠!@, is  










where 𝑝 is the probability of choosing a pricing plan. The probability of h in interval m falling into 
another interval n in the next period therefore is 
















Similarly, denote the transition probability from state m to state n after s periods as 𝑝ST( (𝜃) and 
similarly the transition matrix as 𝑀((𝜃). We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: For any model parameters 𝜃, there exists a unique stationary distribution (or 
limiting distribution) equilibrium for the state. That is, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
(→4
𝑝ST( (𝜃) = 𝑝T(𝜃) exists for any m, n = 
1, 2, …, N. Let 𝑝(𝜃) = (𝑝2(𝜃), 𝑝&(𝜃), … , 𝑝7(𝜃)), where 𝑝T(𝜃) ≥ 0, ∑ 𝑝T(𝜃)7T62 = 1, under the 









Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
Proposition 2 guarantees that, for any set of model parameters, a unique stationary 
distribution for h exists. Therefore, regardless of the initial distribution, a unique distribution of h 
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will exist under a sufficiently large number of iterations. This property helps us solve the initial 
value problem in the model estimation.  
2.4.3 Model Estimation  
Based on the assumption that 𝑒!@'  and 𝑒!@2  are extreme-value type I distributed with zero location 
parameter and a scale parameter 𝜏,	we can rewrite 




k(6{',2} k , (12) 
where r is the Euler constant, and 
𝑉«!(_ℎ!,@32` = 𝐸P𝑢!@_𝑐!,@32∗ _𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32`, 𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32` 
−(𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@) ∙ 𝑐!,@32∗ _𝑠!,@32 = 𝑠, ℎ!,@32` 




­(#6{',2} ­­.    (13)  
Substitute equation (12) into equation (9), we can rewrite the dynamic plan-choice problem as 
𝑉!@(ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) = max{𝑉«!'(ℎ!@) + 𝑒!@' , 𝑉«!2(ℎ!@) + 𝑒!@2 },   (14) 
where  
𝑉«!((ℎ!@) = 𝐸P𝑢!@(𝑐!@∗ (𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@), 𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@) − (𝛾!' + 𝛾!2 ∙ ℎ!@) ∙ 𝑐∗(𝑠!@ = 𝑠, ℎ!@) 









Proposition 1 shows that for the analytical model, a unique equilibrium exists; therefore, 
the value function 𝑉«!((ℎ!@) can be solved through the iteration method. For the econometric model, 
however, the existence of the unique equilibrium is difficult to prove. For each ℎ!@ in the state 
space, we use different initial values for 𝑉«!((ℎ!@) in the model estimation, and find the iteration 
method always converges to the same value. Therefore, we assume 𝑉«!((ℎ!@) will converge to the 
unique equilibrium in practice even with the stochastic components. 
Given the distribution assumption for 𝑒!@'  and 𝑒!@2 , Rust (1987) shows the plan-choice 







                    (15) 
Let 𝑐!@ be the observed consumption level that	is bounded below by zero. Conditional on 
the plan choice 𝑠!@	and the assumption that 𝜔!@  is distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎P&) , the likelihood of 




	1 − Φ_𝛼!1 + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@ − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0}`,																															𝑖𝑓	𝑐!@ = 0
𝜙 ¬	2 ∙ 𝑐!@ ∙ 𝛼!,11 −
𝛼!1 + 𝛼!,1A ∙ ℎ!@ − 𝜇! ∙ 𝑝1 ∙ 1{𝑠!@ = 0}
2 ∙ 𝑎!,11
­ , 𝑖𝑓	𝑐!@ > 0
,			(16) 
where 𝜙 and Φ are the probability density function and cumulative density function of the normal 
distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎P& .  
Combining the likelihoods in (15) and (16), the full likelihood function for observation 
(𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@), conditional on the habit stock ℎ!@  and individual-specific model parameters 𝜃!, is  
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𝐿(𝑐!@ , 𝑠!@|ℎ!@ , 𝜃!) = 𝑃!@2(ℎ!@ , 𝜃!)(!362 ∙ 𝑃!@'(ℎ!@ , 𝜃!)(!36' ∙ 𝑃!@
1|((𝑐!@|𝑠!@ , ℎ!@ , 𝜃!).                    (17) 
To evaluate the likelihood function, however, we need to solve an initial value problem, 
because the consumption stock state when the sample period starts, ℎ!', is unobserved in the data. 
Given individual-specific model parameters, ℎ!' can be systematically different across consumers. 
Ignoring this problem can lead to biased model estimates. To deal with the problem, recall that 
Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a stationary distribution of h. We assume at the beginning 
of period 1 the state variable ℎ!' of each individual comes from the stationary distribution. We 
simulate the stationary distribution as a function of the individual-specific model parameters, and 
draw ℎ!'  multiple times from this distribution. We then calculate the likelihood function 
conditional on the simulated ℎ!', and finally take the average of the likelihoods across draws to 
obtain the simulated likelihood. Given a trial value 𝜃, the detailed estimation procedure is as 
follows: 
1. We first numerically solve the value function 𝑉!@(ℎ!@ , 𝑒!@' , 𝑒!@2 ) defined in equation (14). We set 
the state space for habit stock ℎ!@ as [0, 2000].32 We discretize the state space into grids with 
length of 10, and linearly interpolate the value function within the range.  
2. Next, we calculate the stationary distribution of the state variable h. With the numerical 
solution of the value function, we can calculate the value of the plan-choice probability 𝑃((ℎ) 
with equation (15) for any given ℎ!@. Define interval [10(m-1), 10m] as state m for h. Starting 
from any value of ℎS with state m, the probability for h to transfer from state m to state n, 
𝑝ST(𝜃), can be calculated by 
 
32 We choose the maximum state space as 2,000 because it covers most of the data range (95%). We have also tried 
other values as large as 10,000 and the estimation results are robust. 
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Proposition 2 shows a unique nonnegative vector  P(𝜃) = (𝑝2(𝜃), 𝑝&(𝜃), … , 𝑝&''(𝜃)) exists 
such that 








To compute the limit, we calculate (𝑀(𝜃))T  recursively until |𝑀(𝜃)T32 −𝑀(𝜃)T| < 0.01, 
and obtain the stationary distribution Ρ(𝜃).  
3. Finally, we take 50 draws of the initial value {ℎ!'T } for each individual. With an initial ℎ!'T , ℎ!@ 
can be computed from the monthly reading amount. This approach enables us to calculate the 
simulated maximum likelihood function as 





2:(=3a (ℎ!@T )𝑃!1@(𝑐`@¼, 𝑠`@¼,ℎ!@T )@='T62! . 
During the parameter search, we use the gradient optimization method (BFGS). After it 
converges, we then switch to the Nelder-Meade numerical optimization. We repeat the 
procedure until the increase in the log likelihood becomes trivial (<1e-2). From different 
start points, we find such an algorithm can effectively reach the same global optimum 




For ease of discussion, we ignore the heterogeneity in model parameters across consumers. The 
parameters in the model include all parameters in the utility functions, and the variance for 𝜔’s 
and the scale parameter for e’s, that is, {𝛼1 , 𝛼11 , 𝛼1A , 𝛾', 𝛾2, 𝜇, 𝜏, 𝜎P}. Two additional parameters, 
{𝛽, 𝛿}, represent the discounting factor and the depreciation rate of the consumption stock state. 
Following the previous literature, we fix 𝛽 = 0.98	as the monthly discounting factor. This value 
is equivalent to the daily discounting factor 0.998, as suggested in DellaVigna and Malmendier 
(2006). For the depreciation rate 𝛿 , we find from practice that it is difficult to be separately 
identified from 𝛼1A, the parameter that captures the effect of the consumption stock state on the 
marginal utility of consumption. During the estimation, we vary 𝛿 from 0.1 to 0.9, and choose the 
one (𝛿 = 0.8) that maximizes the likelihood function. We test the robustness by varying the value 
of the two parameters, and find the main results remain unchanged.  
Parameters in the consumption utility function, including {𝛼1 , 𝛼11 , 𝛼1A , 𝜎P},	are identified 
from the data on monthly reading amounts. For those who choose monthly subscription, equation 
(8) shows that multiplying a constant on 𝛼1 , 𝛼11, and 𝛼1A will not change the consumption level. 
Therefore, we normalize 𝑎11 = 0.5 . The optimal consumption level thus is 𝑐!@ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝛼1 +
𝛼1Aℎ!@ + 𝜔!@ , 0}. Given the consumption  states across consumers, we can identify parameters 𝛼1, 
𝛼1A, and the variance 𝜎P. 
The price coefficient 𝜇 is identified from the difference in the reading amount for the same 
individual after she switches pricing plans. Suppose the consumer switches from monthly 
subscription to pay-per-chapter and the reading amount significantly drops. This finding would 
suggest she has a higher value of 𝜇. Given the parameters in the consumption utility, the disutility 
parameters from excessive consumption, (𝛾', 𝛾2), are identified by the proportion of consumers 
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who overpay for pay-per-chapter, relative to the proportion of consumers who overpay under 
monthly subscription across different level of habit stock. In other words, the identification comes 
from the asymmetric overpay pattern across consumers with different consumption pattern history. 
The larger the proportion of consumers who read more than 120 chapters per month and do not 
choose monthly subscription, the larger 𝛾' is among consumers. And the larger overpay amount 
for consumers who have higher habit stock after controlling for the effect of 𝛾', the larger  𝛾2 is 
among consumers.  
Finally, the scale parameter 𝜏 is identified from the plan choice and the corresponding 
reading amount. Suppose, given all other model parameters, the expected value from one pricing 
plan is higher than the other. If the probability that consumers choose the high-valued plan is not 
much higher than the low-valued plan, this scenario implies a large 𝜏 . Note that 𝜏  cannot be 
identified if we only observe the plan choice. We need the reading amount together with the plan 
choice to pin down the parameter.	 
2.5 Results 
In this section, we first discuss the estimation results of the proposed model. We will then discuss 
the estimation results from an alternative model under which there are no time-inconsistent 
preferences and another model assuming consumers are naïve in forming expectation about their 
consumption choice. Based on the proposed model, we use counterfactuals to show how changing 
the pricing plan options available to consumers would affect the consumer welfare and the 
platform’s profit. Finally, we show that a new nonlinear pricing plan with volume surcharge could 
simultaneously improve the consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. Our findings help shed 
light on firms’ pricing strategies for product or service categories for which consumers’ strategic 
self-control behaviors are prevalent. 
84 
 
2.5.1 Estimation Results  
Table 2.4  Main Estimation Results 
beta=0.98 Observation=68,7068      
1-class 
 Segment 1 s.e.     
𝑎1 -124.20 1.13     
𝑎1A 0.86 0.00     
𝜇 7.61 0.44     
𝛾' 124.36 33.49     
𝛾2 0.57 0.02     
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_ 6.57 0.00     
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/ 8.24 0.03     
 Log likelihood -439259 AIC 878532 BIC 878595  
  Segment 1 s.e. Segment 2 s.e.   
2-class 
𝑎1 -124.33 2.29 0.06 11.31   
𝑎1A 0.68 0.01 0.87 0.01   
𝜇 9.31 1.72 0.57 0.13   
𝛾' 124.38 88.71 124.32 153.87   
𝛾2 2.08 0.21 0.29 0.10   
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_ 6.52 0.00     
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/ 8.24 0.24     
Class size 0.54  0.46    
Log likelihood -430996 AIC 862019 BIC 862138  
85 
 
  Segment 1 s.e. Segment 2 s.e. Segment 3 s.e. 





𝑎1 -44.97 3.88 -37.93 4.49 627.21 34.27 
𝑎1A 0.76 0.01 0.79 0.01 1.46 0.02 
𝜇 100.82 4.29 3.78 0.39 0.16 0.01 
𝛾' 100.05 6.26 99.89 40.1 100.01 159.42 
𝛾2 0.58 0.02 0.38 0.02 12.90 1.13 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎_ 6.39 0.00     
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎/ 8.49 0.07     
Class size 0.49  0.47  0.03  
Log likelihood -424730 AIC 849498 BIC 849671  
  We use a latent class approach to model the individual heterogeneity in the utility function. 
We start from a one-class model and keep increasing the number of classes. We find the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) stops increasing when the number of classes reaches three. 
Furthermore, the size of the third class becomes very small (only about 3%). Therefore, we choose 
the three-class specification as our main results. For comparison Table 2.4 reports the estimation 
results from one- to three-class specifications, but we will focus our discussion on the three-class 
model.  
Based on the plan choice and consumption behavior of the three segments implied from 
the estimation results, we name these three consumer segments as self-controllers, powerless 
habitual readers, and enthusiastic readers.  
86 
 
There are two large latent segments, 1 and 2, that are similar in size (49% and 47%, 
respectively), and another very small segment 3 (3%). 33  The plan choice and consumption 
behaviors are significantly different among the three segments. The coefficient 𝛼1 for segment 3 
is the largest, indicating consumers of this segment have the highest reading preference. The 
coefficient 𝛼1A for all three segments is positive, implying the habit stock will enhance consumers’ 
marginal utility for consumption. The magnitude is also the highest for segment 3.  
The price coefficient 𝜇 is positively significant for all three segments; however, segment 1 
is much more price-sensitive than the other two segments. This implies that the reading amount of 
consumers in this segment will decrease much more than that of the other two segments when 
facing a plan with a high marginal cost (e.g., pay-per-chapter). Note that 𝜇 represents the price 
sensitivity during consumption, which can be lower than that in the pricing plan choice stage. The 
difference—if it exists—will be captured in a reduced-form way by 𝛾'  and 𝛾2 . The larger the 
difference in the price sensitivity across different habit stock levels, the higher the value of 𝛾' and 
𝛾2. In Table 2.4, the large estimated 𝛾' across all three segments suggests that the true monetary 
or non-monetary cost of reading web fictions has been seriously under-evaluated by all consumers 
during the consumption stage. Worse still, the positive estimated 𝛾2 suggests that as the habit stock 
increases, the cost will be under-evaluated even more. Therefore, consumers during the pricing 
plan choice stage have an incentive to self-control their future consumption.  
How can they control the consumption level? Obviously choosing the pay-per-chapter plan 
is a feasible option, yet this option works differently across consumers. For consumers of segment 
1, because of their high price sensitivity, the reading amount will significantly drop if they switch 
 
33 The percentages reported are rounded up to the nearest percentage point. 
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from the monthly subscription to the pay-per-chapter plan. For consumers of the other two 
segments, however, their much smaller price sensitivities imply that their reading amount will not 
change much after the switch. As an illustration, we assume that for every consumer, the habit 
stock is at zero level, and calculate the predicted reading amount of each segment. The average 
monthly reading amount of a consumer in segment 1 is 173.2 chapters, with a 53% probability of 
no reading, under the monthly subscription plan. This drops to 133.5 chapters per month, with a 
59% probability of no reading, under the pay-per-chapter plan. In contrast, for a consumer of 
segment 2, the reading amount under monthly subscription is 175.7 chapters per month, with a 
52.5% probability of no reading. Switching to the pay-per-chapter plan will only marginally reduce 
the reading amount.  
The difference in how much reading amount can be reduced will have the main impact on 
the pricing plan choice. We find that the probability of choosing the pay-per-chapter plan is close 
to 100% among consumers of segment 1. The reading amount is 631 chapters under the monthly 
subscription and 435 chapters under the pay-per-chapter plan, across consumers under different 
levels of habit stock in our data. With the 0.1 RMB/chapter price under pay-per-chapter, an average 
consumer in segment 1 pays 43.5 RMB for his/her monthly reading, while the monthly 
subscription would cost them 12 RMB. This suggests that an average consumer in segment 1 is 
willing to pay 31.5 RMB (about 4.6 U.S. dollars) more to reduce their monthly reading amount by 
196 chapters. Assuming it takes five minutes to read one chapter, our results imply that consumers 
of this segment are willing to pay about a little more than four dollars per month to cut their time 
on web fiction by about 16 hours per month (or about half an hour per day). In contrast, the 
probability of choosing the pay-per-chapter plan among consumers of segment 2 gradually drops 
from 55% to 29%, as the habit stock increases from 0 to 2,000 (this is the range among the majority 
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of consumers estimated from the model), indicating a much weaker willingness to conduct self-
control. Given that these consumers are incapable of controlling the reading amount, we find that 
assuming their habit stock starts from zero, it will increase rapidly each month and eventually 
stabilize at a level much higher than that of consumers in segment 1. Consequently, their 
consumption level will also stabilize at a much higher level.  
Because of the differences in consumption behaviors and pricing plan choices—and the 
subsequent changes in the habit stock—between the two segments, we call consumers of segment 
1 self-controllers and consumers of segment 2 powerless habitual readers. Due to their large size, 
these two segments are the most important consumers from the platform’s profit perspective. 
To conclude, our estimation results demonstrate that a high cost is associated with reading 
books, which consumers in the consumption stage do not consider. This leads to the time 
inconsistency problem that incentivizes consumers to use self-control strategies when they make 
the plan choice. We find that about half the number of consumers are self-controllers. They choose 
pay-per-chapter, and most of them overpay. The reason is that this segment is price-sensitive 
during consumption; therefore, paying for each chapter as a self-control strategy would be 
effective in curbing future consumption. Consequently, price-sensitive consumers are more likely 
to overpay. This result is counterintuitive because previous economic and marketing studies have 
found that, all else being equal, price-sensitive consumers will engage in more cost-saving 
purchase and consumption strategies (e.g., taking advantage of price promotions, searching more 
for price information). However, we show that when strategic self-control is an important goal in 
the purchase decision, the result can reverse.  
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2.5.2 Model Fit and Alternative Model Specifications  
To investigate the model fit, we simulate the plan choice and reading amount for each individual 
in the data for six time periods, using the estimation results from the proposed model. We repeat 
the simulation process with 50 different draws from the stationary distribution.  
The upper panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates that the simulated average reading amount for all 
readers is 512.1 chapters per month, whereas it is 506.4 chapters in the actual data. The lower 
panel shows that the average probability of choosing pay-per-chapter in the simulation is 73.38% 
across six months, whereas it is 74.51% in the data. These comparisons indicate that our model 














Figure 2.3:  Model Fit: reading and plan choice 
Our model can also replicate the unique overpaying data patterns we discussed in section 
2.2. Figure 2.4 compares the overpaying probability under each pricing plan predicted by the 
model and the actual data. Our model predicts that around 6.4% of consumers overpay under 
monthly subscription by reading less than 120 chapters, and 45.8% consumers overpay under the 
pay-per-chapter plan by reading more than 120 chapters. In the data, the overpaying proportions 
are 6.6% under the monthly subscription and 34.2% under pay-per-chapter. Our model replicates 


















Figure 2.4 Model Fit:  overpaying ratio 
For comparison purpose, we estimate two alternative models. The first assumes time-
consistent agents, that is, the consumers’ reading amount choice during the consumption stage is 
consistent with the choice during the pricing plan choice stage. This is similar to the empirical 
implementation of the rational addiction theory proposed in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 
(1994). The second one is a model with naive time-inconsistent consumers, that is, during the 
pricing plan choice stage, they assume their choice during the consumption stage does not deviate 
(but indeed it does). Estimation results for time-consistent consumers and naive time-inconsistent 
consumers are reported in Appendix B (Table B1 and Table B2).  
We first look at the predictions from the rational model with time-consistent consumers. 
This model shows worse performance in terms of likelihood and Akaike information criterion /BIC 








Overpay with pay-per-chapter Overpay with monthly subscription
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same except that there are no time-inconsistent parameters (𝛾', 𝛾2in our full model). The estimation 
also gives us three consumer segments. However, this time 94% of the total population has a very 
low price coefficient of 0.34 in consumer segment 1, while the other two segments with higher 
price sensitivities only account for 3% of the consumers. Such results are significantly different 
from our main estimation results where almost half of the consumers have relatively high price 
sensitivity and thus willing to conduct self-control. Without time-inconsistent preference, there is 
no incentive for consumers to choose the costlier pricing plan to curb future consumption. 
Essentially, these estimation results attribute the reason why consumers overpay for their reading 
to very low price sensitivity, which cannot explain the asymmetry in overpaying pattern presented 
in the previous section. With 94% consumers caring very little about the monetary cost, this model 
predicts that the average choice probability of the monthly subscription plan is 62.5%, far higher 
than 25.5% in the data. The model also predicts the average monthly reading amount to be 743 
chapters, well beyond the 506.4 chapters in data. Finally, the predicted proportions of overpaying 
under the pay-per-chapter plan and monthly subscriptions are 23% and 16%, respectively. It fails 
to replicate the high overpaying ratio for the pay-per-chapter plan. These results show that, without 
accounting for the time-inconsistent preferences, a standard rational economic model cannot 
explain the unique behavioral patterns we observe from data. 
For the model with naive consumers, we find that the three-class model has a slightly higher 
log-likelihood value or lower BIC in comparison with the proposed model. Although the model fit 
is better, we believe that this is unlikely to be the true model that explains the unique behavioral 
patterns in data. For example, estimation results show a large consumer segment similar to the 
self-controllers in our proposed model. Using simulations, we find that consumers of this segment 
when making the pricing plan choice expect to read 220 chapters in each month; however, in 
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reality, they consistently read more than 800 chapters. Such under-prediction bias also exists for 
the other two segments. Overall, the model attributes the overpaying pattern to the fact that more 
than 60% consumers systematically underestimate their monthly reading amount by 300 to 800 
chapters a month. Given the consistently high consumption level across individuals, and the ease 
of tracking the reading history, such a considerable underestimation persisting over many months 
is unlikely to happen in our data.  
We further test the robustness of the estimation results under other model specifications. 
We vary the value of 𝛿, the depreciation rate in the habit formation, from 0.1 to 0.9 and re-estimate 
the proposed model. Though other parameters and model implications remain the same, we find 
that the lower the value of 𝛿, the larger is the estimated value of 𝛼1A. However, the multiplication 
𝛿 ∙ 𝛼1A remains stable. We also test different values for the time discounting factor 𝛽, and extend 
the range of the state space to [0, 10,000], which covers 99.9% of the data. All the results are 
similar to the results reported in Table 2.4.  
2.5.3 Counterfactuals  
To illustrate the substantive implications of our study, we investigate four counterfactual scenarios. 
The first two scenarios restrict the pricing plans that consumers can choose, and the last two 
scenarios increase consumers’ options by separately introducing a nonlinear pricing plan with 
volume discount and another with volume surcharge. We use random draws from the stationary 
distribution calculated from our estimation result as the initial consumption stock state. In each 
scenario, we simulate the plan and reading choices of consumers from each segment, until the 
reading distribution becomes stable after the policy change.34 We then compare the difference in 
 
34 We simulate the data for 12 periods under all scenarios and use the last six months for comparison. We find that 
the reading-amount distribution typically stabilizes after 2 to 4 months. 
94 
 
the monthly average reading amount, consumer welfare, and the platform’s profit (measured by 
the revenue). It is straightforward to measure the change in reading amount and revenue under new 
pricing policies. To measure consumer welfare, we follow the “dictator of the present” method 
(see Cropper and Laibson, 1998; Caplin and Leahy, 2000; Gruber and Köszegi, 2001). We measure 
a consumer’s welfare as the discounted value of his life-time utility flow under the model 
equilibrium. Given that a unique stationary distribution exists in our model, we randomly draw the 
initial state from the stationary distribution for each consumer segment 50 times and calculate the 
average of the value functions. To compute the change in overall consumer welfare across different 
consumer segments, we calculate the weighted average of the percentage change for each 
consumer segments.  
Table 2.5 Counterfactual Results 
Monthly Subscription Only 






Reading amount  44.41% 0.51% 0.00% 16.82% 
Firm revenue -79.52% -71.91% -85.77% -76.95% 
Consumer welfare -76.06% -6.96% -0.01% -40.54% 
Pay-per-chapter only (Linear Pricing) 
 






Reading amount  0.00% -0.69% 0.00% -0.38% 
Firm revenue 0.00% 102.87% 96.82% 46.35% 
Consumer welfare 0.15% -9.74% -0.01% -4.51% 
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Pay-per-chapter only (Volume Discount) 
 






Reading amount  9.02% -0.42% 0.00% 3.13% 
Firm revenue 6.51% 95.79% 70.74% 45.48% 
Consumer welfare -26.14% -10.05% -0.01% -17.54% 
Pay-per-chapter only (Volume Surcharge) 
 






Reading amount  -7.48% -0.94% 0.00% -3.30% 
Firm revenue -6.98% 109.84% 108.68% 46.02% 
Consumer welfare 14.47% -9.81% -0.01% 2.48% 
The first counterfactual restricts consumers’ option to monthly subscription only. This 
scenario is reminiscent of the practice of Netflix, which only offers the monthly subscription plan 
for watching movies. Consumers choose whether to subscribe or not. The results are in the first 
panel of Table 2.5. As expected, the reading amount of self-controllers will increase by 44.41% 
(from 441 chapters to 637 chapters) per month, when they do not have the option of choosing the 
pay-per-chapter plan to curb consumption. Across all three segments, the reading amount increases 
by 16.82%. Without the pay-per-chapter plan, the welfare of self-controllers decreases by 76.06%. 
The platform’s profit from this segment also drops by 79.52%. Overall, the consumer welfare 
drops by 40.54% and the platform’s profit drop by 76.95%. The reason that higher reading amounts 
generate much less profit for the platform is that consumers who used to read around 600 to 700 
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chapters a month and still pay by chapters now have to switch to the monthly subscription. As a 
result, the average revenue per consumer drops from 60~70 RMB to 12 RMB per month.  
In the second counterfactual, the platform only offers the pay-per-chapter plan. This 
scenario mimics the video game market, in which players have to pay for each game title. The 
second panel of Table 2.5 reports the results. Because almost all self-controllers choose pay-per-
chapter, the policy change has a very limited effect on them. Powerless habitual readers and 
enthusiastic readers are more affected. Given that the consumers of these two segments are less 
price-sensitive, they will continue to maintain the high consumption under the pay-per-chapter 
plan, and therefore, will pay significantly more to the platform. Consequently, the consumer 
welfare of powerless habitual readers will decrease by 9.74%.35 Overall, consumer welfare will 
reduce by 4.51%. The profit of the platform will significantly increase by 46.35%, mostly from 
the powerless habitual readers.  
The above two counterfactuals suggest that taking away options from consumers will result 
in a decrease in consumer welfare. We further investigate if there exists a pricing policy that could 
improve both the platform’s profit and consumers’ well-being. In the next two counterfactuals, we 
introduce a step-wise pay-per-chapter pricing structure, where the price is a nonlinear function of 
the reading amount. In the third counterfactual, we introduce a novel volume discount plan with a 
nonlinear structure. Under this plan, consumers pay 0.12 RMB for the first 400 chapters every 
month, after which the price decreases by 0.04 RMB. The 400-chapter threshold is chosen based 
on the median reading amount under the pay-per-chapter scenario. As the pay-per-chapter plan 
charges 0.1 RMB, the new plan is more expensive if a consumer reads below 400 chapters. The 
 
35 For enthusiastic readers, they are very price insensitive and have a high reading preference, hence, their welfare is 
not much affected. 
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third panel of Table 2.5 reports the results. Offering the additional pricing plan, the platform’s 
profit will decrease by 45.48%. This is because consumers can switch from the pay-per-chapter 
plan to the volume discount plan and pay less for reading. Though consumers pay less, consumer 
welfare will reduce by 17.54%. This is due to the higher non-monetary cost as they consume more. 
Finally, we introduce a novel volume surcharge plan. Under this plan, consumers are 
charged 0.08 RMB for the first 400 chapters they read and 0.12 RMB afterwards. Such a pricing 
scheme is similar to the anti-addiction law for minors playing video games in China, wherein the 
reward from the game (such as virtual coins) decrease or are forfeited by the system when a player 
spends a certain amount of time playing video games. If the player keeps playing, he/she will be 
forced to quit the game for a certain period (usually 24 hours) before being allowed to log back 
into the game. Under such a pricing scheme, our results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 
2.5. With this additional pricing plan, self-controllers’ welfare will increase by 14.47%, as many 
of these consumers will switch from the pay-per-chapter plan to the new plan, and thus, reduce 
their reading amount by 7.48%. The welfare of powerless habitual readers, on the other hand, will 
decrease because they pay more for reading (though their reading amount will marginally reduce). 
Overall, the aggregate consumer welfare will increase by 2.48%, while the platform’s profit also 
increases by 46.02%. This profit increase is only 0.33% less than the profit increase generated 
when the platform only offers a pay-per-chapter plan in the second counterfactual.  
The findings from the four counterfactuals are astonishing. Taking away the monthly 
subscription option in the second counterfactual implies the platform forces consumers to restrict 
their consumption. Our results show that consumers who would have chosen monthly subscription 
will still read a lot, and thus, overpay under the pay-per-chapter plan. Therefore, choosing a pricing 
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strategy that helps prevent consumption in this empirical setting can benefit the platform. A pricing 
plan with volume surcharge, which will restrict consumers’ overall consumption, can 
simultaneously improve the platform’s profit and consumer welfare. By charging a higher price 
when reading above a certain level, the plan helps self-controllers to further control their 
consumption and also generate more revenue for the platform from powerless habitual readers, 
who already have a strong habit of reading web fictions. In contrast, pricing strategies that 
encourage more consumption, such as offering the monthly subscription only, will hurt not only 
the consumer welfare but also the platform’s profit. The managerial implications will be 
completely the opposite if one does not take time-inconsistent preferences and consumers’ 
strategic self-control into account. This highlights the substantive contribution of our study. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine how consumers overpay for reading web fiction as a means of strategic 
self-control when time-inconsistent preferences exist during consumption. Using data from one of 
China’s largest digital book platforms, we find a large percentage of consumers consistently 
choose pay-per-chapter even when the monthly subscription plan would be less costly. To explain 
this behavior, we construct a dynamic structural model featuring habit formation and time-
inconsistent preferences and demonstrate that choosing a costlier pricing plan to curb consumption 
can be optimal for consumers. We apply our model to the data. Estimation results suggest that the 
market has three segments of consumers. Self-controllers overpay for the pay-per-chapter plan 
because the high cost of reading can effectively work as a “commitment device” to restrict future 
consumption. In the counterfactuals, we show that eliminating the pay-per-chapter plan would hurt 
consumer welfare and the platform’s profit. Eliminating the monthly subscription plan, however, 
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would increase the platform’s profit but reduce consumer welfare. We introduce a novel nonlinear 
pricing plan with volume surcharge and show how it can simultaneously improve the platform’s 
profit and consumer welfare.  
Our study contributes both theoretically and empirically to the literature on consumer time-
inconsistent preferences and strategic self-control behaviors. Findings from our structural model 
help shed light on firms’ pricing strategies in the digital content market. Despite its contributions, 
this research has limitations that call for future study. First, the lack of price variation in our data 
limits our ability to investigate the optimal prices the platform should charge for various pricing 
plans. Second, due to the lack of data, our study abstracts away from platform competition, which 
may bias our counterfactual results. For example, if removing the monthly subscription would 
push heavy readers to switch to another competing platform, the increase in the focal platform’s 
profit would be more limited. Finally, we acknowledge that strategic self-control may not be the 
only mechanism that can explain the overpaying behavior. One can use surveys to test what is the 
underlying mechanism that drives the observed consumer behaviors.  
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Appendix A. Additional Proofs for Chapter 2 
A1. Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 2 
In this section, we provide the detailed proof of proposition 1, showing the analytical solution to 
our baseline model. Before we start the formal proof, we first restate the problems to be solved:   
𝑉(ℎ) = max
(
𝑢>(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) − 𝜇𝑝(1{𝑠 = 1} + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ$)	 [1] 
𝑢>(𝑐, 𝑠, ℎ) = (𝛼1 + 𝛼1Aℎ)𝑐 − 𝛼11𝑐& − 𝜇𝑝11{𝑠 = 0}𝑐 − 𝛾𝑐 [2] 
ℎ$ = (1 − 𝛿)ℎ + 𝑐	 [3] 
𝑐∗(𝑠, ℎ) ≡
𝛼1 + 𝛼1Aℎ − 𝜇𝑝11{𝑠 = 0}
2𝛼11
𝑖𝑓	𝑐∗ ≥ 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	0	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒, [4] 
where equation 4 is easily derived from the maximization of the utility function in equation 2 in 
terms of consumption c. 36 For notation simplicity, let 𝑢((ℎ) ≡ 𝑢>(𝑐∗(𝑠, ℎ), 𝑠, ℎ) 	− 𝜇𝑝(1{𝑠 = 1}, 
we can rewrite the problems above as: 
𝑉(ℎ) = max
(
{𝑉'(ℎ), 𝑉2(ℎ)} [5] 
𝑉'(ℎ) = 𝑢'(ℎ) + 𝛽 ∗ max	{𝑉'(ℎ'), 𝑉2(ℎ')} 
		𝑉2(ℎ) = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽 ∗ max{𝑉'(ℎ2), 𝑉2(ℎ2)}. 
 
36 It is straightforward to see that if 𝑠 = 1, 𝑐∗ > 0; if s=0, then if 𝑐∗=0 at time t, all consumers’ future decisions will 



















Where 𝑉'(ℎ)/𝑉2(ℎ) and ℎ'/ℎ2 represent the value function and the next-period consumption stock 
when the consumer chooses s=0/s=1 for the current period.  
Notice that for a given plan choice s, the value function V is continuous in terms of the state 
variable h. Given the state space is a compact set (a closed interval on ℛ2), the contraction mapping 
theorem holds and there exists a unique fixed point for value function V for any h. 








Because consumption is nonnegative, h is also nonnegative. So we further impose an additional 
assumption. 
Assumption I 
2𝛿𝛼11 − 𝛼1A > 0 [7] 
Assumption I guarantees at least one of the steady states is positive. This assumption also give us 
an ideal property of the model:  The “slope” in the linear equation 6 is strictly less than 1 under 
assumption I, which ensures both steady states as convergent steady state for the model. Before 
we prove the existence of the equilibria, we first consider a simple case in which the consumers 
always choose s=1 or s=0. Denote the value under these scenarios as 𝑊((ℎ), we have 
																										𝑊'(ℎ) = 𝑢'(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊'(ℎ')  
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																																																			𝑊2(ℎ) = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊2(ℎ2).																																															[8] 
Because 𝑢((ℎ)	is a quadratic form in h and equation 6 is linear in h, we know W must also be 
quadratic functions of h. Plugging equation 2 and 6 into equation 8, we can solve for the 𝑊((ℎ). 
Assume 
																																																						𝑊'(ℎ) = 𝑎'ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐'																																																[9] 
𝑊2(ℎ) = 𝑎2ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2. 
To keep the notation from being overcomplicated, we introduce a new set of utility parameter 
notations such that 
	
																																																							𝑢'(ℎ) = 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵'ℎ + 𝐶'                                         [10] 
𝑢2(ℎ) = 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2ℎ + 𝐶2 
ℎ' = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓' 
ℎ2 = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2. 
Now, we can use equation 8 to solve for the parameters in equation 9 in terms of these simplified 
notations for utility parameters: 





























































Notice 𝑎2 = 𝑎',	 so 𝑊2(ℎ) −𝑊'(ℎ) = (𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ − (𝑐' − 𝑐2) , which is linear in h and thus 
guarantees the “single-crossing” property of 𝑊2(ℎ) and 𝑊'(ℎ). Equipped with these results, we 
start the formal proof of proposition 1. Our method is by guess and verify of the value function 
and then solve for the policy function. 
1. When 𝒉𝟐𝒔𝒔 > 𝒉𝟏∗ > 𝒉𝟏𝒔𝒔 
𝑉 = 𝑎ℎ
& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐', ℎ < ℎ2∗








Without loss of generosity, assume the consumer starts with some initial consumption stock state 
ℎ > ℎ2∗. If the above value function is correct, after one iteration, V will remain identical. In other 
words, because ℎ > ℎ2∗, we need to show that for any h after the consumer makes the optimal plan-
choice decision to maximize the value function, V will still be equal to 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2 after it is 
plugged into equation 5. Given assumption I, we know that if the consumer chooses monthly 
subscription s=1, ℎ2∗ 	is lower than her next-period consumption stock state, ℎ2 . However, it is 
undetermined whether ℎ' > ℎ2∗. So, we discuss two cases here. 
Case I  ℎ' < ℎ2∗ 
𝑉(ℎ) = max	(𝑉'(ℎ), 𝑉2(ℎ)) 
											= max Æ𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵'ℎ + 𝐶' + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ'
& + 𝑏'ℎ' + 𝑐'k , 𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2ℎ + 𝐶2
+ 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ2& + 𝑏2ℎ2 + 𝑐2kÇ	
											= max{𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐', 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2}	
											= 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2, 
where the second equation utilizes the “fixed-point” property of 𝑊2 and 𝑊&, and the third equation 
is simply algebra with the fact the 𝑏2 > 𝑏' and 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2>	𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐' with any ℎ >
ℎ2∗ = (𝑐' − 𝑐2)/(𝑏2 − 𝑏'). 




𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵'ℎ + 𝐶' + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ'
& + 𝑏2ℎ' + 𝑐2k ,
𝐴ℎ& + 𝐵2ℎ + 𝐶2 + 𝛽 f𝑎ℎ2
& + 𝑏2ℎ2 + 𝑐2k
È 
           																									= max 𝑎ℎ
& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐' + 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')],
𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2
	
																																					= max	{	𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐' + 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')], 
																																																					𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐' + [(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')]}. 
Because ℎ > ℎ2∗ > ℎ2((, by equation 6, we know that ℎ > ℎ' so we have  
[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')] > 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')] 					> 	𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')ℎ' + (𝑐2 − 𝑐')], 
	and																	𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏2ℎ + 𝑐2.  
Similarly, we can prove that for any ℎ < ℎ2∗ , 𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑎ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐'.  
Given the functional form of the value function, it is straightforward to solve for the optimal policy 
function 𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ 1(ℎ > ℎ2∗) + 0 ∗ 1(ℎ < ℎ2∗). 
2. When 𝒉𝟏∗>𝒉𝟐𝒔𝒔>𝒉𝟏𝒔𝒔, 
𝑉(ℎ) = Ér𝛽
@	𝑢2(ℎ@) + 𝛽f132(𝑎'ℎf132




𝑎'ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐'																																																										𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, 
where 
ℎ' = ℎ 
ℎ@32 = 𝑒ℎ@ + 𝑓2; 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑇A 
𝑇A = ë
log (1 − e)h&
∗ − f2
(1 − e)h − f2




(𝑐' − 𝑐2) + 𝛽[(𝑏2 − 𝑏')𝑓2 + 𝑐2 − 𝑐']




First, we define the “difference function” Z(h) as 
 
𝑍(ℎ) ≡ 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊'(ℎ2) −𝑊'(ℎ) = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑊'(𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2) −𝑊'(ℎ). 
 
Z(h) measures the lifetime utility difference between when consumers always choose 
pay-per-chapter and when consumers purchase monthly subscription in the current period 
and choose to pay-per-chapter starting next period. When Z(h)=0, the consumer receives 
same utility value no matter what price plan he chooses in the next time period, given that 
he keep pay-per-chapter since the third time period. With some algebra, we can show 
𝑍(ℎ) = (𝐵2 + 𝛽(2𝑎𝑒𝑓2 + 𝑏'𝑒) − 𝑏')ℎ + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2) + 𝛽(𝑏2 − 𝑏')𝑓2 
										= (𝐵2 − 𝐵' + 𝛽_2𝑎𝑒(𝑓2 − 𝑓')`ℎ + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2) + 𝛽(𝑏2 − 𝑏')𝑓2, 
where the second equation uses the fixed-point property of 𝑊'(ℎ). Because 𝐵2 > 𝐵' and 
𝑓2 > 𝑓'  (the utility for monetary cost is always negative), Z(h) is a linear monotone 
increasing function in h, and ℎ&∗  is the unique solution to Z(h)=0. So,  
𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤'(ℎ2) ≥ 𝑤'(ℎ)	∀ℎ ≥ ℎ&∗ 	 [11] 
																																			𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤'(ℎ2) < 𝑤'(ℎ)	∀ℎ < ℎ&∗ ,                                       [12] 
and vice versa.  





(1 − 𝛽)(𝑐' − 𝑐2)
𝑏2 − 𝑏'
+ 𝛽𝑓2
1 − 𝛽𝑒 	
						=
(1 − 𝛽)ℎ2∗ + 𝛽𝑓2
1 − 𝛽𝑒 	
						>
(1 − 𝛽)ℎ&(( + 𝛽𝑓2
1 − 𝛽𝑒 	
							=
(1 − 𝛽)𝑓2
1 − 𝑒 + 𝛽𝑓2
1 − 𝛽𝑒 	
							=
𝑓2
1 − 𝑒 = ℎ&
((, 
where the third equation is derived from the expression of ℎ&(( in the form of 𝑓2 and e. 
Finally, we show the value function above is the fixed point of equation 5. Without 
loss of generosity, assume some consumer with initial consumption stock state ℎ > ℎ&∗  at 
the initial period t=0. We first show by induction that for any T (for any h), when the 
consumer starts with any consumption stock state ℎ ≥ ℎ&∗ , the optimal plan choice is 
always s=1. 
by equation 11, we know that for 𝑇A=0, 
𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽(𝑎'ℎ&& + 𝑏'ℎ& + 𝑐') = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤'(ℎ2) ≥ 	𝑤'(ℎ) = 𝑎'ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐'. 
























The proof above establishes that when the consumer starts with any consumption stock state ℎ ≥
ℎ&∗ , the optimal decision is always to choose s=1 at the current period . We now show that after 
one iteration, the value function remains the same functional form. Because the next-period 
consumption stock states will be ℎ2 under s=1, again we discuss two cases in which ℎ2 ≥ ℎ&∗  and 
ℎ2 < ℎ&∗ : 
Case I. ℎ2 ≥ ℎ&∗  
 𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ2) 
																					= 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽(r𝛽@	𝑢2(ℎ@32) + 𝛽f1%32(𝑎'ℎf1%3&




Because ℎ2 = 𝑒ℎ + 𝑓2, 𝑇A% = 𝑇A − 1, 
           =	∑ 𝛽@	𝑢2(ℎ@) + 𝛽f132_𝑎'ℎf132





Case II. ℎ2 < ℎ&∗  
  When ℎ$$ < ℎ&∗ , it is straightforward to see for any time period we have 
 𝑉(ℎ) = 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑉(ℎ2)																					 
																								= 𝑢2(ℎ) + 𝛽(𝑎'ℎ2
& + 𝑏'ℎ2 + 𝑐') 
                     = ∑ 𝛽@	𝑢2(ℎ@) + 𝛽f132_𝑎'ℎf132
& + 𝑏'ℎf132 + 𝑐'`
f1
@6' . 
The above case confirms that under either case, the value function always remains the same 
functional form. Use equation 12 instead of equation 11, we can repeat the same proof above and 
show for any ℎ < ℎ&∗ ,	𝑉(ℎ) = 	𝑎'ℎ& + 𝑏'ℎ + 𝑐'.		 
Thus, we have proved that for any h when ℎ2∗>ℎ&((>ℎ2((, the policy function is 
𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ (ℎ > ℎ&∗) + 0 ∗ (ℎ < ℎ&∗). 
Symmetrically, when ℎ&((>ℎ2((>ℎ2(( , we can show 𝑠(ℎ) = 1 ∗ (ℎ > ℎ&∗∗) + 0 ∗ (ℎ < ℎ&∗∗), where 
ℎ&∗∗	is the unique solution to  
𝑢'(ℎ) + 𝛽𝑤2(ℎ') − 𝑤2(ℎ) = 0. 




A2. Proof of Proposition 2 in Chapter 2 
Because it is obvious that all states for h are aperiodic given 𝑝S,S, (𝜃) > 0 for any m. To prove 
the existence of the limiting distribution, we only need to show that all states for h are irreducible, 
which means for any state 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, , … , 𝐻, ∃	𝑛'  s.t.  𝑝!"
T$ > 0 . Together with aperiodic and 
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irreducible states, the Markov chain for h is ergodic. Thus, the ergodicity theorem guarantees the 
existence of the limiting distribution for h specified in proposition 2.  
For any i, we first show that if 𝑗 ≥ 𝑖, then ∃	𝑛' = 1	s.t. 𝑝!"2 >0: without loss of generosity, we start 




𝐻k.	The c.d.f. for the next period ofconsumption 
stock state ℎ′ follows the c.d.f 𝑓(ℎ$|ℎ, 𝜃), which is specified in the main text right before the 
proposition 2. Because the consumption is nonnegative, it is straightforward to see that  




𝐻 > ℎ > (1 − 𝛿)ℎ, so 






Similarly, we can show that for any j that ":2
7
𝐻 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)ℎ, 𝑝!"2 > 0. Because limT→4(1 − 𝛿)
Tℎ =
0, for any j that ":2
7
𝐻 ≥ 0, there always exists a finite 𝑛' so that 𝑝!"
T$ > 0.  
Now that we have established that any i, j=1, 2 , … , N, ∃	𝑛' s.t.  𝑝!"
T$ > 0 , together with the facts 
that the Markov chain is aperiodic, we have proved the {ℎ@} is an ergodic Markov chain that has a 










Appendix B. Additional Estimation Results for Chapter 2 








beta=0.98 Observation=68,706      
3-Class 
 Segment 1 s.e. Segment 2 s.e. Segment 3 s.e. 
ah -113.41 0.41 -25.16 0.84 760.39 31.25 
ahi 0.34 37.56 557.86 0.69 0.63 0.02 
µ 0.88 418.03 0.65 623.96 1.52 2.23 
logσj 6.38 3.63     
logσZ 8.49 0.02     
Class 




AIC 848697 BIC 848870   
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2 s.e. Segment 3 s.e. 
ah -37.17 6.61 -32.78 6.25 627.14 31.25 




µ 160.37 5.49 1.40 0.08 0.07 2.23 
γ' 649.33 72.65 20.52 0.30 100.30 31.82 
γ2 63.27 57.33 0.09 
7.81
E-04 14.30 0.05 
logσj 8.54 
3.19E-
02     
logσZ 6.39 
1.38E-
04     
Class size 0.44  0.41  0.15  
Log 
likelihood 
-424329 AIC 848697 BIC 848870.44   
